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Introduction			Randomized	controlled	trials	(RCTs)	are	currently	widely	visible	in	economics	today	and	have	been	used	in	the	subject	at	least	since	the	1960s	(see	Greenberg	and	Shroder	(2004)	for	a	compendium).	It	is	often	claimed	that	such	trials	can	discover	“what	works”	in	economics,	as	well	as	in	political	science,	education,	and	social	pol-icy.	Among	both	researchers	and	the	general	public,	RCTs	are	perceived	to	yield	causal	inferences	and	estimates	of	average	treatment	effects	(ATEs)	that	are	more	reliable	and	more	credible	than	those	from	any	other	empirical	method.	They	are	taken	to	be	largely	exempt	from	the	myriad	econometric	problems	that	characterize	observational	studies,	to	require	minimal	substantive	assumptions,	little	or	no	prior	information,	and	to	be	largely	independent	of	“expert”	knowledge	that	is	often	re-garded	as	manipulable,	politically	biased,	or	otherwise	suspect.		There	are	now	“What	Works”	centers	using	and	recommending	RCTs	in	a	range	of	areas	of	social	concern	across	Europe	and	the	Anglophone	world.	These	centers	see	RCTs	as	their	preferred	tool	and	indeed	often	prefer	RCT	evidence	lexi-cographically.	As	one	of	many	examples,	the	US	Department	of	Education’s	standard	for	“strong	evidence	of	effectiveness”	requires	a	“well-designed	and	implemented”	RCT;	no	observational	study	can	earn	such	a	label.	This	“gold	standard”	claim	about	RCTs	is	less	common	in	economics,	but	Imbens	(2010,	407)	writes	that	“randomized	experiments	do	occupy	a	special	place	in	the	hierarchy	of	evidence,	namely	at	the	very	top.”	The	Abdul	Latif	Jameel	Poverty	Action	Lab	(J-PAL),	whose	stated	mission	is	“to	reduce	poverty	by	ensuring	that	policy	is	informed	by	scientific	evidence”,	ad-vertises	that	its	affiliated	professors	“conduct	randomized	evaluations	to	test	and	improve	the	effectiveness	of	programs	and	policies	aimed	at	reducing	poverty”,	J-PAL	(2017).	The	lead	page	of	its	website	(echoed	in	the	‘Evaluation’	section)	notes	“843	ongoing	and	completed	randomized	evaluations	in	80	countries”	with	no	men-tion	of	any	studies	that	are	not	randomized.	In	medicine,	the	gold	standard	view	has	long	been	widespread,	e.g.	for	drug	trials	by	the	FDA;	a	notable	exception	is	the	recent	paper	by	Frieden	(2017),	ex-di-
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rector	of	the	U.S.	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	who	lists	key	limita-tions	of	RCTs	as	well	as	a	range	of	contexts	where	RCTs,	even	when	feasible,	are	dominated	by	other	methods.		We	argue	that	any	special	status	for	RCTs	is	unwarranted.	Which	method	is	most	likely	to	yield	a	good	causal	inference	depends	on	what	we	are	trying	to	dis-cover	as	well	as	on	what	knowledge	is	already	available.	When	little	prior	knowledge	is	available,	no	method	is	likely	to	yield	well-supported	conclusions.	This	paper	is	not	a	criticism	of	RCTs	in	and	of	themselves,	let	alone	an	attempt	to	identify	good	and	bad	studies.	Instead,	we	will	argue	that,	depending	on	what	we	want	to	discover,	why	we	want	to	discover	it,	and	what	we	already	know,	there	will	often	be	superior	routes	of	investigation.		We	present	two	sets	of	arguments.	The	first	is	an	enquiry	into	the	idea	that	ATEs	estimated	from	RCTS	are	likely	to	be	closer	to	the	truth	than	those	estimated	in	other	ways.	The	second	explores	how	to	use	the	results	of	RCTs	once	we	have	them.	In	the	first	section,	our	discussion	runs	in	familiar	terms	of	bias	and	efficiency,	or	expected	loss.	None	of	this	material	is	new,	but	we	know	of	no	similar	treatment,	and	we	wish	to	dispute	many	of	the	claims	that	are	frequently	made	in	the	applied	literature.	Some	routine	misunderstandings	are:	(a)	randomization	ensures	a	fair	trial	by	ensuring	that,	at	least	with	high	probability,	treatment	and	control	groups	differ	only	in	the	treatment;	(b)	RCTs	provide	not	only	unbiased	estimates	of	ATEs	but	also	precise	estimates;	(c)	statistical	inference	in	RCTs,	which	requires	only	the	simple	comparison	of	means,	is	straightforward,	so	that	standard	significance	tests	are	reliable.		Nothing	we	say	in	the	paper	should	be	taken	as	a	general	argument	against	RCTs;	we	are	simply	trying	to	challenge	unjustifiable	claims,	and	expose	misunder-standings.	We	are	not	against	RCTs,	only	magical	thinking	about	them.	The	misun-derstandings	are	important	because	we	believe	that	they	contribute	to	the	common	perception	that	RCTs	always	provide	the	strongest	evidence	for	causality	and	for	ef-fectiveness.			
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In	the	second	part	of	the	paper,	we	discuss	how	to	use	the	evidence	from	RCTs.	The	non-parametric	and	theory-free	nature	of	RCTs,	which	is	arguably	an	ad-vantage	in	estimation,	is	often	a	disadvantage	when	we	try	to	use	the	results	outside	of	the	context	in	which	the	results	were	obtained;	credibility	in	estimation	can	lead	to	incredibility	in	use.	Much	of	the	literature,	perhaps	inspired	by	Campbell	and	Stanley’s	(1963)	famous	“primacy	of	internal	validity”,	appears	to	believe	that	inter-nal	validity	is	not	only	necessary	but	almost	sufficient	to	guarantee	the	usefulness	of	the	estimates	in	different	contexts.	But	you	cannot	know	how	to	use	trial	results	without	first	understanding	how	the	results	from	RCTs	relate	to	the	knowledge	that	you	already	possess	about	the	world,	and	much	of	this	knowledge	is	obtained	by	other	methods.	Once	the	commitment	has	been	made	to	seeing	RCTs	within	this	broader	structure	of	knowledge	and	inference,	and	when	they	are	designed	to	en-hance	it,	they	can	be	enormously	useful,	not	just	for	warranting	claims	of	effective-ness	but	for	scientific	progress	more	generally.	Cumulative	science	is	not	advanced	through	magical	thinking.	
	 The	literature	on	the	precision	of	ATEs	estimated	from	RCTs	goes	back	to	the	very	beginning.	Gosset	(writing	as	`Student’)	never	accepted	Fisher’s	arguments	for	randomization	in	agricultural	field	trials	and	argued	convincingly	that	his	own	non-random	designs	for	the	placement	of	treatment	and	controls	yielded	more	precise	estimates	of	treatment	effects	(see	Student	(1938)	and	Ziliak	(2014)).	Gosset	worked	for	Guinness	where	inefficiency	meant	lost	revenue,	so	he	had	reasons	to	care,	as	should	we.	Fisher	won	the	argument	in	the	end,	not	because	Gosset	was	wrong	about	efficiency,	but	because,	unlike	Gosset’s	procedures,	randomization	pro-vides	a	sound	basis	for	statistical	inference,	and	thus	for	judging	whether	an	esti-mated	ATE	is	different	from	zero	by	chance.	Moreover,	Fisher’s	blocking	procedures	can	limit	the	inefficiency	from	randomization	(see	Yates	(1939)).	Gosset’s	reserva-tions	were	echoed	much	later	in	Savage’s	(1962)	comment	that	a	Bayesian	should	not	choose	the	allocation	of	treatments	and	controls	at	random	but	in	such	a	way	that,	given	what	else	is	known	about	the	topic	and	the	subjects,	their	placement	re-veals	the	most	to	the	researcher.	These	issues	about	how	to	incorporate	prior	infor-mation	into	randomized	trials	are	central	to	Section	1.	
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	 In	economics,	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	RCTs	are	well	explored	in	the	volumes	by	Hausman	and	Wise	(1985)	and	by	Garfinkel	and	Manski	(1992);	in	the	latter,	the	introduction	by	Garfinkel	and	Manski	is	a	balanced	summary	of	what	ran-domized	trials	can	and	cannot	do.	The	paper	in	that	volume	by	Heckman	(1992)	raises	many	of	the	issues	that	he	and	his	coauthors	have	explored	in	subsequent	pa-pers,	see	in	particular	Heckman	and	Smith	(1995),	and	Heckman,	Lalonde	and	Smith	(1999)	who	focus	on	labor	market	experiments.	Manski	(2013)	contains	a	good	summary	of	both	strengths	and	weaknesses.		 There	is	also	a	more	contested	recent	literature.	On	the	one	hand,	there	are	procedures	that	take	as	fundamental	the	unrestricted	individual	treatment	effects	of	individuals	and	seek	non-parametric	approaches	to	estimating	their	average.	On	the	other	hand,	these	procedures	are	contrasted	with	an	approach	that	uses	elements	of	economic	theory	to	define	parameters	of	interest	and	to	identify	magnitudes	that	are	likely	to	be	invariant	to	policy	manipulation	or	across	contexts,	where	invari-ance	is	defined	in	the	sense	of	Hurwicz	(1966).	The	introduction	in	Imbens	and	Wooldridge	(2009)	provide	an	eloquent	defense	of	the	treatment-effect	formulation.	It	emphasizes	the	credibility	that	comes	from	a	theory-free	specification	with	almost	unlimited	heterogeneity	in	treatment	effects.	The	introduction	in	Heckman	and	Vytlacil	(2007)	makes	an	equally	eloquent	case	against,	noting	that	the	crucial	ingre-dients	of	treatments	in	RCTs	are	often	not	clearly	specified—so	that	we	often	do	not	know	what	the	treatment	really	is—and	that	the	treatment	effects	are	hard	to	link	to	invariant	parameters	that	would	be	useful	elsewhere.	Aspects	of	the	same	debate	feature	in	Imbens	(2010),	Athey	and	Imbens	(2017),	Angrist	and	Pischke	(2017),	Heckman	(2005,	2008,	2010)	and	Heckman	and	Urzua	(2010).				 Deaton	(2010)	complains	about	the	use	of	instrumental	variables,	including	randomization,	as	a	substitute	for	thinking	about	and	constructing	models	of	eco-nomic	development.	He	argues	against	the	idea	that	using	RCTs	to	evaluate	projects	to	discover	“what	works”	can	ever	yield	a	systematic	body	of	scientific	knowledge	that	can	be	used	to	reduce	or	eliminate	poverty.	That	paper	is	an	argument	against	the	usefulness	of	the	heterogeneous	treatment	approach.	It	argues	that	refusing	to	
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model	heterogeneity,	though	avoiding	assumptions,	precludes	the	sort	of	cumula-tive	research	program	that	might	yield	useful	policy.	The	paper’s	claim	that	RCTs	have	no	special	claim	to	generate	credible	and	useful	knowledge	was	challenged	by	Imbens	(2010);	some	of	his	arguments	are	answered	below.	Cartwright	(2007)	and	Cartwright	and	Munro	(2010)	challenge	any	“gold	standard”	view	of	RCTs.	Cart-wright	(2011,	2012,	2016)	and	Cartwright	and	Hardie	(2012)	focus	on	the	question	of	how	to	use	the	results	of	RCTs	and	what	we	can	learn	when	an	experiment	shows	that	some	policy	works	somewhere.	Section	2	pursues	these	issues	in	general	and	through	case	studies.		
Section	1:	Do	RCTs	give	good	estimates	of	Average	Treatment	Effects	In	this	section,	we	explore	how	to	estimate	average	treatment	effects	(ATEs)	and	the	role	of	randomization.	We	note	first	that	estimating	ATEs	is	only	one	of	many	uses	for	the	data	generated	by	an	RCT.	We	start	from	a	trial	sample,	a	collection	of	sub-jects	that	will	be	allocated	randomly	to	either	the	treatment	or	control	arm	of	the	trial.	This	“sample”	might	be,	but	rarely	is,	a	random	sample	from	some	population	of	interest.	More	frequently,	it	is	selected	in	some	way,	for	example	to	those	willing	to	participate,	or	is	simply	a	convenience	sample	that	is	available	to	the	trialists.	Given	random	allocation	to	treatments	and	controls,	the	data	from	the	trial	allow	the	identification	of	two	distributions,	𝐹"(𝑌")	and	𝐹&(𝑌&),	of	outcomes	𝑌"	and	𝑌&	in	the	treated	and	untreated	cases	within	the	trial	sample.	The	estimated	ATE	is	the	differ-ence	in	means	of	the	two	distributions	and	is	the	focus	of	much	of	the	literature	in	social	science	and	medicine.	Yet	policy	makers	and	researchers	may	well	be	inter-ested	in	other	features	of	the	two	distributions.	For	example,	if	Y	is	income,	they	may	be	interested	in	whether	a	treatment	reduced	income	inequality,	or	in	what	it	did	to	the	10th	or	90th	percentiles	of	the	income	distribution,	even	though	different	people	occupy	those	percentiles	in	the	treatment	and	control	distributions	(see	Bit-ler	et	al	(2006)	for	an	example	in	US	welfare	policy).	Cancer	trials	standardly	use	the	median	difference	in	survival,	which	compares	the	times	until	half	the	patients	have	died	in	each	arm.	More	comprehensively,	policy	makers	may	wish	to	compare	ex-pected	utilities	for	treated	and	untreated	under	the	two	distributions	and	consider	
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optimal	expected-utility	maximizing	treatment	rules	conditional	on	the	characteris-tics	of	subjects	(see	Manski	(2004)	and	Manski	and	Tetenov	(2016);	Bhattacharya	and	Dupas	(2012)	contains	an	application.)	These	uses	are	important,	but	we	focus	on	ATEs	here	and	do	not	consider	these	other	uses	of	RCTs	any	further	in	this	paper.			1.1	What	does	randomization	do?		A	useful	way	to	think	about	the	estimation	of	treatment	effects	is	to	use	a	schematic	linear	causal	model	of	the	form:			 		 (1)	where,	 	is	the	outcome	for	unit	i,		𝑇( 	is	a	dichotomous	(1,0)	treatment	dummy	indi-cating	whether	or	not	i	is	treated,	and	𝛽( 	is	the	individual	treatment	effect	of	the	treatment	on	i.		The	x’s	are	the	observed	or	unobserved	other	linear	causes	of	the	outcome,	and	we	suppose	that	(1)	captures	a	minimal	set	of	causes	of	𝑌( 	sufficient	to	fix	its	value.	J	may	be	(very)	large.	Because	the	heterogeneity	of	the	individual	treat-ment	effects,	𝛽( ,	is	unrestricted,	we	allow	the	possibility	that	the	treatment	interacts	with	the	x’s	or	other	variables,	so	that	the	effects	of	T	can	depend	on	any	other	varia-bles.	Note	that	we	do	not	need	i	subscripts	on	the	𝛾’s	that	control	the	effects	of	the	other	causes;	if	their	effects	differ	across	individuals,	we	include	the	interactions	of	individual	characteristics	with	the	original	x’s	as	new	x’s.	Given	that	the	x’s	can	be	unobservable,	this	is	not	restrictive.		Consider	an	experiment	that	aims	to	tell	us	something	about	the	treatment	effects;	this	might	or	might	not	use	randomization.	Either	way,	we	can	represent	the	treatment	group	as	having	𝑇( = 1	and	the	control	group	as	having	𝑇( = 0.		Given	the	study	(or	trial)	sample,	subtracting	the	average	outcomes	among	the	controls	from	the	average	outcomes	among	the	treatments,	we	get		
 
Y
1
−Y
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1
+ γ j (xij
1
−
j=1
J
∑ xij
0
) = β
1
+ (S
1
− S
0
) 		 (2)	The	first	term	on	the	far-right-hand	side	of	(2),	which	is	the	ATE	in	the	trial	sample,	is	what	we	want,	but	the	second	term	or	error	term,	which	is	the	sum	of	the	net	av-erage	balance	of	other	causes	across	the	two	groups,	will	generally	be	non-zero	and	
Yi = βiTi + γ j xijj=1
J∑
Yi
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needs	to	be	dealt	with	somehow.	We	get	what	we	want	when	the	means	of	all	the	other	causes	are	identical	in	the	two	groups,	or	more	precisely	(and	less	onerously)	when	the	sum	of	their	net	differences	𝑆" − 𝑆&	is	zero;	this	is	the	case	of	perfect	bal-
ance.	With	perfect	balance,	the	difference	between	the	two	means	is	exactly	equal	to	the	average	of	the	treatment	effects	among	the	treated,	so	that	we	have	the	ultimate	precision	in	that	we	know	the	truth	in	the	trial	sample,	at	least	in	this	linear	case.	As	always,	the	“truth”	here	refers	to	the	trial	sample,	and	it	is	always	important	to	be	aware	that	the	trial	sample	may	not	be	representative	of	the	population	that	is	ulti-mately	of	interest,	including	the	population	from	which	the	trial	sample	comes;	any	such	extension	requires	further	argument.		 How	do	we	get	balance,	or	something	close	to	it?	What,	exactly,	is	the	role	of	randomization?	In	a	laboratory	experiment,	where	there	is	usually	much	prior	knowledge	of	the	other	causes,	the	experimenter	has	a	good	chance	of	controlling	(or	subtracting	away	the	effects	of)	the	other	causes,	aiming	to	ensure	that	the	last	term	in	(1)	is	close	to	zero.	Failing	such	knowledge	and	control,	an	alternative	is	
matching,	which	is	frequently	used	in	statistical,	medical,	and	econometric	work.	For	each	subject,	a	match	is	found	that	is	as	close	as	possible	on	all	suspected	causes,	so	that,	once	again,	the	last	term	in	(1)	can	be	kept	small.	When	we	have	a	good	idea	of	the	causes,	matching	may	also	deliver	a	precise	estimate.	Of	course,	when	there	are	unknown	or	unobservable	causes	that	have	important	effects,	neither	laboratory	control	nor	matching	offers	protection.		 What	does	randomization	do?	Since	the	treatments	and	controls	come	from	the	same	underlying	distribution,	randomization	guarantees,	by	construction,	that	the	last	term	on	the	right	in	(1)	is	zero	in	expectation,	subject	to	the	caveat	that	no	correlations	of	the	x’s	with	Y	are	introduced	post-randomization,	for	example	by	subjects	not	accepting	their	assignment.	The	expectation	here	is	taken	over	re-peated	randomizations	on	the	trial	sample,	each	with	its	own	allocation	of	treat-ments	and	controls.	Assuming	that	our	caveat	holds,	the	last	term	in	(2)	will	be	zero	when	averaged	over	this	infinite	number	of	(entirely	hypothetical)	replications,	and	
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the	average	of	the	estimated	ATEs	will	be	the	true	ATE	in	the	trial	sample.	So	𝛽"de-livers	an	unbiased	estimate	of	the	ATE	among	the	treated	in	the	trial	sample,	and	it	does	so	whether	or	not	the	causes	are	observed.	Unbiasedness	does	not	require	us	to	know	anything	about	the	other	causes	though	it	does	require	that	they	not	change	after	randomization	so	as	to	make	them	correlated	with	the	treatment,	which	is	an	important	caveat	to	which	we	shall	return.	If	the	RCT	is	repeated	many	times	on	the	same	trial	sample,	then,	assuming	our	caveat	holds	in	the	trials,	the	last	term	in	(2)	will	be	zero	when	averaged	over	an	infinite	number	of	(entirely	hypothetical)	trials,	and	the	average	of	the	estimated	ATEs	will	be	the	true	ATE	in	the	trial	sample.	Of	course,	none	of	this	is	true	in	any	one	trial	where	the	difference	in	means	will	be	equal	to	the	average	treatment	effect	among	those	treated	plus	the	term	that	reflects	the	imbalance	in	the	net	effects	of	the	other	causes.	We	do	not	know	the	size	of	this	error	term,	and	there	is	nothing	in	randomization	that	limits	its	size;	by	chance	the	randomization	in	our	single	trial	can	over-represent	an	important	excluded	cause(s)	in	one	arm	over	the	other,	in	which	case	there	will	be	a	difference	between	the	means	of	the	two	groups	that	is	not	caused	by	the	treatment.			 The	unbiasedness	result	can	easily	be	compromised.	In	particular,	the	treat-ment	must	not	be	correlated	with	any	other	cause.	Random	assignment	is	designed	to	aid	with	this,	but	it	is	not	sufficient	if,	for	example,	there	is	lack	of	blinding	so	that	individuals	are	aware	of	their	assignment,	or	if	those	administering	the	treatment	are	so	aware,	and	if	that	awareness	triggers	another	cause.	Similarly,	researchers	sometimes	return	to	individuals	who	were	randomized	years	before,	so	that	there	has	been	time	for	the	subjects	or	others	to	learn	their	assignment	or	for	other	causes	to	be	influenced	by	the	assignment.	This	again	opens	up	the	possibility	of	unbal-anced	effects	of	causes	other	than	the	treatment	we	are	interested	in.	We	have	al-ready	noted	that	unbiasedness	refers	to	the	trial	sample,	which	may	or	may	not	be	representative	of	the	population	of	interest.	If	we	were	to	repeat	the	trial	many	times,	the	over-representation	of	the	un-balanced	causes	will	sometimes	be	in	the	treatments	and	sometimes	in	the	controls.	The	imbalance	will	vary	over	replications	of	the	trial,	and	although	we	cannot	see	this	from	our	single	trial,	we	should	be	able	to	capture	its	effects	on	our	estimate	of	
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the	ATE	from	an	estimated	standard	error.	This	was	Fisher’s	innovation:	not	that	randomization	balanced	other	causes	between	treatments	and	controls	but	that,	conditional	on	our	caveat	above,	randomization	provides	the	basis	for	calculating	the	size	of	the	error.	Getting	the	standard	error	and	associated	significance	state-ments	right	are	of	the	greatest	importance.	Given	the	absence	of	treatment-related	post-randomization	changes	in	other	causes,	randomization	yields	an	unbiased	esti-mate	of	the	ATE	in	the	trial	sample	as	well	as	a	sound	method	for	measuring	error	of	estimation	in	that	sample;	therein	lies	its	virtue,	not	that	it	yields	precise	estimates	through	balance.		1.2	Misunderstandings:	claiming	too	much	Everything	so	far	should	be	perfectly	familiar,	but	exactly	what	randomization	does	is	frequently	lost	in	the	practical	literature.	There	is	often	confusion	between	perfect	control,	on	the	one	hand	(as	in	a	laboratory	experiment	or	perfect	matching	with	no	unobservable	causes),	and	control	in	expectation	on	the	other,	which	is	what	ran-domization	contributes.	If	we	knew	enough	about	the	problem	to	be	able	to	control	well,	that	is	what	we	would	do.	Randomization	is	an	alternative	when	we	do	not	know	enough,	but	is	generally	inferior	to	good	control.	We	suspect	that	at	least	some	of	the	popular	and	professional	enthusiasm	for	RCTs,	as	well	as	the	belief	that	they	are	precise	by	construction,	comes	from	misunderstandings	about	balance.	These	misunderstandings	are	not	so	much	among	the	trialists	who	will	often	give	a	correct	account	when	pressed.	They	come	from	imprecise	statements	by	trialists	that	are	taken	literally	by	the	lay	audience	that	the	trialists	are	keen	to	reach.		Such	a	misunderstanding	is	well	captured	by	a	quote	from	the	second	edition	of	the	online	manual	on	impact	evaluation	jointly	issued	by	the	Inter-American	De-velopment	Bank	and	the	World	Bank	(the	first,	2011	edition	is	similar):	“We	can	be	confident	that	our	estimated	impact	constitutes	the	true	impact	of	the	program,	since	we	have	eliminated	all	observed	and	unobserved	fac-tors	that	might	otherwise	plausibly	explain	the	difference	in	outcomes.”	Ger-tler,	Martinez,	Premand,	Rawlings,	and	Vermeersch	(2016,	69).	
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This	statement	is	false,	because	it	confuses	actual	balance	in	any	single	trial	with	balance	in	expectation	over	many	(hypothetical)	trials.	If	it	were	true,	and	if	all	fac-tors	were	indeed	controlled	(and	no	imbalances	were	introduced	post	randomiza-tion),	the	difference	would	be	an	exact	measure	of	the	average	treatment	effect	among	the	treated	in	the	trial	population	(at	least	in	the	absence	of	measurement	er-ror).	We	should	not	only	be	confident	of	our	estimate	but,	as	the	quote	says,	we	would	know	that	it	is	the	truth.	Note	that	the	statement	contains	no	reference	to	sample	size;	we	get	the	truth	by	virtue	of	balance,	not	from	a	large	number	of	obser-vations.		A	similar	quote	comes	from	John	List,	one	of	the	most	imaginative	and	suc-cessful	scholars	who	use	RCTs:	“complications	that	are	difficult	to	understand	and	control	represent	key	rea-sons	to	conduct	experiments,	not	a	point	of	skepticism.	This	is	because	ran-domization	acts	as	an	instrumental	variable,	balancing	unobservables	across	control	and	treatment	groups.”	Al-Ubaydli	and	List	(2013)	(italics	in	the	orig-inal.)	And	from	Dean	Karlan,	founder	and	President	of	Yale’s	Innovations	for	Poverty	Ac-
tion,	which	runs	development	RCTs	around	the	world:		“As	in	medical	trials,	we	isolate	the	impact	of	an	intervention	by	randomly	assigning	subjects	to	treatments	and	control	groups.	This	makes	it	so	that	all	those	other	factors	which	could	influence	the	outcome	are	present	in	treat-ment	and	control,	and	thus	any	difference	in	outcome	can	be	confidently	at-tributed	to	the	intervention.”	Karlan,	Goldberg	and	Copestake	(2009)	And	from	the	medical	literature,	from	a	distinguished	psychiatrist	who	is	deeply	skeptical	of	the	use	of	evidence	from	RCTs,	“The	beauty	of	a	randomized	trial	is	that	the	researcher	does	not	need	to	un-derstand	all	the	factors	that	influence	outcomes.	Say	that	an	undiscovered	ge-netic	variation	makes	certain	people	unresponsive	to	medication.	The	ran-domizing	process	will	ensure—or	make	it	highly	probable—that	the	arms	of	the	trial	contain	equal	numbers	of	subjects	with	that	variation.	The	result	will	be	a	fair	test.”	(Kramer,	2016,	p.	18)	
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Claims	are	even	made	that	RCTs	reveal	knowledge	without	possibility	of	error.	Judy	Gueron,	the	long-time	president	of	MDRC,	which	has	been	running	RCTs	on	US	gov-ernment	policy	for	45	years,	asks	why	federal	and	state	officials	were	prepared	to	support	randomization	in	spite	of	frequent	difficulties	and	in	spite	of	the	availability	of	other	methods	and	concludes	that	it	was	because	“they	wanted	to	learn	the	truth,”	Gueron	and	Rolston	(2013,	429).	There	are	many	statements	of	the	form	“We	know	that	[project	X]	worked	because	it	was	evaluated	with	a	randomized	trial,”	Dynarski	(2015).		 It	is	common	to	treat	the	ATE	from	an	RCT	as	if	it	were	the	truth,	not	just	in	the	trial	sample	but	more	generally.	In	economics,	a	famous	example	is	Lalonde’s	(1986)	study	of	training	programs,	whose	results	were	at	odds	with	a	number	of	previous	non-randomized	studies.	The	paper	prompted	a	large-scale	re-examination	of	the	observational	studies	to	try	to	bring	them	into	line,	though	it	now	seems	just	as	likely	that	the	differences	lie	in	the	fact	that	the	study	results	apply	to	different	populations	(Heckman,	Lalonde,	and	Smith	(1999)).	In	epidemiology,	Davey-Smith	and	Ibrahim	(2002)	state	that	“observational	studies	propose,	RCTs	dispose”.	A	good	example	is	the	RCT	of	hormone	replacement	therapy	(HRT)	for	post-menopau-sal	women.	HRT	had	previously	been	supported	by	positive	results	from	a	high-quality	and	long-running	observational	study,	but	the	RCT	was	stopped	in	the	face	of	excess	deaths	in	the	treatment	group.	The	negative	result	of	the	RCT	led	to	wide-spread	abandonment	of	the	therapy,	which	might	have	been	a	mistake	(see	Vanden-broucke	(2009)	and	Frieden	(2017)).	Yet	the	medical	and	popular	literature	rou-tinely	states	that	the	RCT	was	right	and	the	earlier	study	wrong,	simply	because	the	earlier	study	was	not	randomized.	The	gold	standard	or	“truth”	view	does	harm	when	it	undermines	the	obligation	of	science	to	reconcile	RCTs	results	with	other	evidence	in	a	process	of	cumulative	understanding.			 The	false	belief	in	automatic	precision	suggests	that	we	need	pay	no	atten-tion	to	the	other	causes	in	(1)	or	(2).	Indeed,	Gerber	and	Green	(2012),	in	their	standard	text	for	RCTs	in	political	science,	write	that	running	an	RCT	is	“a	research	strategy	that	does	not	require,	let	alone	measure,	all	potential	confounders.”	This	is	true	if	we	are	happy	with	estimates	that	are	arbitrarily	far	from	the	truth,	just	so	
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long	as	the	errors	cancel	out	over	a	series	of	imaginary	experiments.	In	reality,	the	causality	that	is	being	attributed	to	the	treatment	might,	in	fact,	be	coming	from	an	imbalance	in	some	other	cause	in	our	particular	trial;	limiting	this	requires	serious	thought	about	possible	confounders.	1.3	Sample	size,	balance,	and	precision	At	the	time	of	randomization	and	in	the	absence	of	post-randomization	changes	in	other	causes,	a	trial	is	more	likely	to	be	balanced	when	the	sample	size	is	large.	As	the	sample	size	tends	to	infinity,	the	means	of	the	x’s	in	the	treatment	and	control	groups	will	become	arbitrarily	close.	Yet	this	is	of	little	help	in	finite	samples.	As	Fisher	(1926)	noted:	“Most	experimenters	on	carrying	out	a	random	assignment	will	be	shocked	to	find	how	far	from	equally	the	plots	distribute	themselves,”	quoted	in	Morgan	and	Rubin	(2012).	Even	with	very	large	sample	sizes,	if	there	is	a	large	number	of	causes,	balance	on	each	cause	may	be	infeasible.	Even	with	just	three	causes	with	three	values	each,	there	are	27	cells	to	balance,	and	in	most	social	and	medical	cases	there	will	be	more.	Vandenbroucke	(2004)	notes	that	there	are	three	billion	base	pairs	in	the	human	genome,	many	or	all	of	which	could	be	relevant	prog-nostic	factors	for	the	biological	outcome	that	we	are	seeking	to	influence.	It	is	true,	as	(2)	makes	clear,	that	we	do	not	need	balance	on	each	cause	individually,	only	on	their	net	effect,	the	term	𝑆" − 𝑆&.	But	consider	the	human	genome	base	pairs.	Out	of	all	of	those	billions,	only	one	might	be	important,	and	if	that	one	is	unbalanced,	the	results	of	a	single	trial	can	be	far	from	the	truth.	Statements	about	large	samples	guaranteeing	balance	are	not	useful	without	guidelines	about	how	large	is	large	enough,	and	such	statements	cannot	be	made	without	knowledge	of	other	causes	and	how	they	affect	outcomes.	Of	course,	lack	of	balance	in	the	net	effect	of	either	observables	or	non-observables	in	(2)	does	not	compromise	the	inference	in	an	RCT	in	the	sense	of	obtaining	a	standard	error	for	the	unbiased	ATE	(see	Senn	(2013)	for	a	particularly	clear	statement).		 Having	run	an	RCT,	it	makes	good	sense	to	examine	any	available	covariates	for	balance	between	the	treatments	and	controls;	if	we	suspect	that	an	observed	variable	x	is	a	possible	cause,	and	its	means	in	the	two	groups	are	very	different,	we	
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should	treat	our	results	with	appropriate	suspicion.	In	practice,	trialists	in	econom-ics	(and	in	some	other	disciplines)	usually	carry	out	a	statistical	test	for	balance	af-ter	randomization	but	before	analysis,	presumably	with	the	aim	of	taking	some	ap-propriate	action	if	balance	fails.	The	first	table	of	the	paper	typically	presents	the	sample	means	of	observable	covariates—the	observable	x’s	in	(1)	or	interactive	fac-tors	represented	in	β—for	the	control	and	treatment	groups,	together	with	their	dif-ferences,	and	tests	for	whether	or	not	they	are	significantly	different	from	zero,	ei-ther	variable	by	variable,	or	jointly.	These	tests	are	appropriate	for	unbiasedness	if	we	are	concerned	that	the	random	number	generator	might	have	failed,	or	if	we	are	worried	that	the	randomization	is	undermined	by	non-blinded	subjects	who	sys-tematically	undermine	the	allocation.	Otherwise,	unbiasedness	is	guaranteed	by	the	randomization,	whatever	the	tests	show,	and	as	the	next	paragraph	demonstrates,	the	test	is	not	informative	about	the	balance	that	would	lead	to	precision.		If	we	write	𝜇&	and	𝜇"	for	the	(vectors	of)	true	means	in	the	trial	sample	(i.e.	the	means	over	all	possible	randomizations)	of	the	observed	causes	of	Y	in	the	con-trol	and	treatment	groups	at	the	point	of	assignment,	the	null	hypothesis	is	(pre-sumably,	as	judged	by	the	typical	balance	test)	that	the	two	vectors	are	identical,	with	the	alternative	being	that	they	are	not.	But	if	the	randomization	has	been	cor-rectly	done	the	null	hypothesis	is	true	by	construction	(see	e.g.	Altman	(1985)	and	Senn	(1994)),	which	may	help	explain	why	it	so	rarely	fails	in	practice.	As	Begg	(1990)	notes,	“(I)t	is	a	test	of	a	null	hypothesis	that	is	known	to	be	true.	Therefore,	if	the	test	turns	out	to	be	significant	it	is,	by	definition,	aa	false	positive.”	This	is,	of	course,	consistent	with	Fisher’s	comments	about	the	plots	in	the	field,	which	notes	that	two	samples	of	plots	randomly	drawn	from	the	same	field	can	look	very	unbal-anced.	Indeed,	although	we	cannot	“test”	it	in	this	way,	we	know	that	the	null	hy-pothesis	is	also	true	for	the	unobservable	causes.	Note	the	contrast	with	the	state-ment	quoted	above	claiming	that	RCTs	guarantee	balance	on	causes	across	treat-ment	and	control	groups.	Those	statements	refer	to	balance	of	causes	at	the	point	of	assignment	in	any	single	trial,	which	is	not	guaranteed	by	randomization,	whereas	the	balance	tests	are	about	the	balance	of	causes	at	the	point	of	assignment	in	expec-
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tation	over	many	trials,	which	is	guaranteed	by	randomization.	The	confusion	is	per-haps	understandable,	but	it	is	a	confusion	nevertheless.	Of	course,	it	is	always	good	practice	to	look	for	imbalances	between	observed	covariates	in	any	single	trial	using	some	more	appropriate	distance	measure,	for	example	the	normalized	difference	in	means	(Imbens	and	Wooldridge	(2009,	equation	3)).	Similarly,	it	would	have	been	good	practice	for	Fisher	to	abandon	a	randomization	in	which	there	were	clear	pat-terns	in	the	(random)	distribution	of	plots	across	the	field,	even	though	the	treat-ment	and	control	plots	were	randomly	selections	that,	by	construction,	could	not	differ	“significantly”	using	the	standard	(incorrect)	balance	test.	Whether	such	im-balances	should	be	seen	as	undermining	the	estimate	of	the	ATE	depends	on	our	priors	about	which	covariates	are	likely	to	be	important,	and	how	important,	which	is	(not	coincidentally)	the	same	thought	experiment	that	is	routinely	undertaken	in	observational	studies	when	we	worry	about	confounding.	One	procedure	to	improve	balance	is	to	adapt	the	design	before	randomiza-tion,	for	example,	by	stratification.	Fisher,	who	as	the	quote	above	illustrates,	was	well	aware	of	the	loss	of	precision	from	randomization	argued	for	“blocking”	(strati-fication)	in	agricultural	trials	or	for	using	Latin	Squares,	both	of	which	restrict	the	amount	of	imbalance.	Stratification,	to	be	useful,	requires	some	prior	understanding	of	the	factors	that	are	likely	to	be	important,	and	so	it	takes	us	away	from	the	“no	knowledge	required”	or	“no	priors	accepted”	appeal	of	RCTs;	it	requires	thinking	about	and	measuring	covariates.	But	as	Scriven	(1974,	103)	notes:	“(C)ause	hunting,	like	lion	hunting,	is	only	likely	to	be	successful	if	we	have	a	considerable	amount	of	relevant	background	knowledge”.	Cartwright	(1994,	Chapter	2)	puts	it	even	more	strongly,	“no	causes	in,	no	causes	out”.	Stratification	in	RCTs,	as	in	other	forms	of	sampling,	is	a	standard	method	for	using	background	knowledge	to	increase	the	precision	of	an	estimator.	It	has	the	further	advantage	that	it	allows	for	the	explora-tion	of	different	ATEs	in	different	strata	which	can	be	useful	in	adapting	or	trans-porting	the	results	to	other	locations	(see	Section	2).		 Stratification	is	not	possible	if	there	are	too	many	covariates,	or	if	each	has	many	values,	so	that	there	are	more	cells	than	can	be	filled	given	the	sample	size.		With	five	covariates,	and	ten	values	on	each,	and	no	priors	to	limit	the	structure,	we	
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would	have	100,000	possible	strata.	Filling	these	is	well	beyond	the	sample	sizes	in	most	trials.	An	alternative	that	works	more	generally	is	to	re-randomize.	If	the	ran-domization	gives	an	obvious	imbalance	on	known	covariates—treatment	plots	all	on	one	side	of	the	field,	all	of	the	treatment	clinics	in	one	region,	too	many	rich	and	too	few	poor	in	the	control	group—we	try	again,	and	keep	trying	until	we	get	a	bal-ance	measured	as	a	small	enough	distance	between	the	means	of	the	observed	co-variates	in	the	two	groups.	Morgan	and	Rubin	(2012)	suggest	the	Mahalanobis	D–statistic	be	used	as	a	criterion	and	use	Fisher’s	randomization	inference	(to	be	dis-cussed	further	below)	to	calculate	standard	errors	that	take	the	re-randomization	into	account.	An	alternative,	widely	adapted	in	practice,	is	to	adjust	for	covariates	by	running	a	regression	(or	covariance)	analysis,	with	the	outcome	on	the	left-hand	side	and	the	treatment	dummy	and	the	covariates	as	explanatory	variables,	includ-ing	possible	interactions	between	covariates	and	treatment	dummies.	Freedman	(2008)	shows	that	the	adjusted	estimate	of	the	ATE	is	biased	in	finite	samples,	with	the	bias	depending	on	the	correlation	between	the	squared	treatment	effect	and	the	covariates.	Accepting	some	bias	in	exchange	for	greater	precision	will	often	make	sense,	though	it	certainly	undermines	any	gold	standard	argument	that	relies	on	un-biasedness	without	consideration	of	precision.	1.4	Should	we	randomize?	The	tension	between	randomization	and	precision	that	goes	back	to	Fisher,	Gosset,	and	Savage	has	been	reopened	in	recent	papers	by	Kasy	(2016),	Banerjee,	Chassang,	and	Snowberg	(BCS)	(2016)	and	Banerjee,	Chassang,	Montero,	and	Snowberg	(BCMS)	(2016).			 The	trade-off	between	bias	and	precision	can	be	formalized	in	several	ways,	for	example	by	specifying	a	loss	or	utility	function	that	depends	on	how	a	user	is	af-fected	by	deviations	of	the	estimate	of	the	ATE	from	the	truth	and	then	choosing	an	estimator	or	an	experimental	design	that	minimizes	expected	loss	or	maximizes	ex-pected	utility.	As	Savage	(1962)	noted,	for	a	Bayesian,	this	involves	allocating	treat-ments	and	controls	in	“the	specific	layout	that	promised	to	tell	him	the	most,”	but	
without	randomization.	Of	course,	this	requires	serious	and	perhaps	difficult	thought	about	the	mechanisms	underlying	the	ATE,	which	randomization	avoids.	Savage	also	
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notes	that	several	people	with	different	priors	may	be	involved	in	an	investigation	and	that	individual	priors	may	be	unreliable	because	of	“vagueness	and	temptation	to	self-deception,”	defects	that	randomization	may	alleviate,	or	at	least	evade.	BCMS	(2016)	provide	a	proof	of	a	Bayesian	no-randomization	theorem,	and	BCS	(2016)	provide	an	illustration	of	a	school	administrator	who	has	long	believed	that	school	outcomes	are	determined,	not	by	school	quality,	but	by	parental	background,	and	who	can	learn	the	most	by	placing	deprived	children	in	(supposed)	high-quality	schools	and	privileged	children	in	(supposed)	low-quality	schools,	which	is	the	kind	of	study	setting	that	case	study	methodology	is	well	attuned	to.	As	BCS	note,	this	al-location	would	not	persuade	those	with	different	priors,	and	they	propose	randomi-zation	as	a	means	of	satisfying	skeptical	observers.		Several	points	are	important.	First,	the	anti-randomization	theorem	is	not	a	justification	of	any	non-randomized	design,	for	example,	one	that	allows	selection	on	unobservables,	but	only	the	optimal	design	that	is	most	informative.	According	to	Chalmers	(2001)	and	Bothwell	and	Podolsky	(2016),	the	development	of	randomi-zation	in	medicine	originated	with	Bradford-Hill,	who	used	randomization	in	the	first	RCT	in	medicine—the	streptomycin	trial—because	it	prevented	doctors	select-ing	patients	on	the	basis	of	perceived	need	(or	against	perceived	need,	leaning	over	backward	as	it	were),	an	argument	recently	echoed	by	Worrall	(2007).	Randomiza-tion	serves	this	purpose,	but	so	do	other	non-discretionary	schemes;	what	is	re-quired	is	that	hidden	information	should	not	be	allowed	to	affect	the	allocation.	Second,	the	ideal	rules	by	which	units	are	allocated	to	treatment	or	control	depend	on	the	covariates	and	on	the	investigators’	priors	about	how	the	covariates	affect	the	outcomes.	This	opens	up	all	sorts	of	methods	of	inference	that	are	long	fa-miliar	to	economists	but	that	are	excluded	by	pure	randomization.	For	example,	what	philosophers	call	the	hypothetico-deductive	method	works	by	using	theory	to	make	a	prediction	that	can	be	taken	to	the	data	for	potential	falsification	(as	in	the	school	example	above).	This	is	the	way	that	physicists	learn,	as	do	economists	when	they	use	theory	to	derive	predictions	that	can	be	tested	against	the	data,	perhaps	in	an	RCT,	but	more	frequently	not.	Some	of	the	most	fruitful	research	programs	in	economics	have	been	generated	by	the	puzzles	that	result	when	the	data	fail	to	
	 18	
match	such	theoretical	predictions,	such	as	the	equity	premium	puzzle,	various	pur-chasing	power	parity	puzzles,	the	Feldstein-Horioka	puzzle,	the	consumption	smoothness	puzzle,	the	puzzle	of	calorie	decline	in	the	face	of	malnourishment	and	income	growth,	and	many	others.		Third,	randomization,	by	running	roughshod	over	prior	information	from	theory	and	from	covariates,	is	wasteful	and	even	unethical	when	it	unnecessarily	ex-poses	people,	or	unnecessarily	many	people,	to	possible	harm	in	a	risky	experiment.	Worrall	(2008)	documents	the	(extreme)	case	of	ECMO,	a	new	treatment	for	new-borns	with	persistent	pulmonary	hypertension	that	was	developed	in	the	1970s	by	intelligent	and	directed	trial	and	error	within	a	well-understood	theory	of	the	dis-ease.	In	early	experimentation	by	the	inventors,	mortality	was	reduced	from	80	to	20	percent.	The	investigators	felt	compelled	to	conduct	an	RCT,	albeit	with	an	adap-tive	‘play-the-winner’	design	in	which	each	success	in	an	arm	increased	the	proba-bility	of	the	next	baby	being	assigned	to	that	arm.	One	baby	received	conventional	therapy	and	died,	11	received	ECMO	and	lived.	Even	so,	a	standard	randomized	con-trolled	trial	was	thought	necessary.	With	a	stopping	rule	of	four	deaths,	four	more	babies	(out	of	ten)	died	in	the	control	group	and	none	of	the	nine	who	received	ECMO.	Fourth,	the	non-random	methods	use	prior	information,	which	is	why	they	do	better	than	randomization.	This	is	both	an	advantage	and	a	disadvantage,	de-pending	on	one’s	perspective.	If	prior	information	is	not	widely	accepted,	or	is	seen	as	non-credible	by	those	we	are	seeking	to	persuade,	we	will	generate	more	credible	estimates	if	we	do	not	use	those	priors.	Indeed,	this	is	why	BCS	(2016)	recommend	randomized	designs,	including	in	medicine	and	in	development	economics.	They	de-velop	a	theory	of	an	investigator	who	is	facing	an	adversarial	audience	who	will	challenge	any	prior	information	and	can	even	potentially	veto	results	based	on	it	(think	of	administrative	agencies	such	as	the	FDA	or	journal	referees).	The	experi-menter	trades	off	his	or	her	own	desire	for	precision	(and	preventing	possible	harm	to	subjects),	which	would	require	prior	information,	against	the	wishes	of	the	audi-ence,	who	wants	nothing	to	do	with	those	priors.	Even	then,	the	approval	of	the	au-dience	is	only	ex	ante;	once	the	fully	randomized	experiment	has	been	done,	nothing	
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stops	critics	arguing	that,	in	fact,	the	randomization	did	not	offer	a	fair	test	because	important	other	causes	were	not	balanced.	Among	doctors	who	use	RCTs,	and	espe-cially	meta-analysis,	such	arguments	are	(appropriately)	common	(see	Kramer	(2016)).	Today,	when	the	public	has	come	to	question	expert	prior	knowledge,	RCTs	will	flourish.	In	cases	where	there	is	good	reason	to	doubt	the	good	faith	of	experi-menters,	as	in	many	pharmaceutical	trials,	randomization	will	indeed	be	an	appro-priate	response.	But	we	believe	such	arguments	are	destructive	for	scientific	en-deavor	(which	is	not	the	purpose	of	the	FDA)	and	should	be	resisted	as	a	general	prescription	in	scientific	research.	Previous	knowledge	needs	to	be	built	on	and	in-corporated	into	new	knowledge,	not	discarded	in	the	face	of	aggressive	ignorance.	The	systematic	refusal	to	use	prior	knowledge	and	the	associated	preference	for	RCTs	are	recipes	for	preventing	cumulative	scientific	progress.	In	the	end,	it	is	also	self-defeating.	To	quote	Rodrik	(2016)	“the	promise	of	RCTs	as	theory-free	learning	machines	is	a	false	one.”		1.5	Statistical	inference	in	RCTs	The	estimated	ATE	in	a	simple	RCT	is	the	difference	in	the	means	between	the	treat-ment	and	control	groups.	When	covariates	are	allowed	for,	as	in	most	RCTs	in	eco-nomics,	the	ATE	is	usually	estimated	from	the	coefficient	on	the	treatment	dummy	in	a	regression	that	looks	like	(1),	but	with	the	heterogeneity	in	𝛽	ignored.	Modern	work	calculates	standard	errors	allowing	for	the	possibility	that	residual	variances	may	be	different	in	the	treatment	and	control	groups,	usually	by	clustering	the	standard	errors,	which	is	equivalent	to	the	familiar	two	sample	standard	error	in	the	case	with	no	covariates.	Statistical	inference	is	done	with	t-values	in	the	usual	way.	These	procedures	do	not	always	give	the	right	answer.			 Looking	back	at	(1),	the	underlying	objects	of	interest	are	the	individual	treatment	effects	𝛽( 	for	each	of	the	individuals	in	the	trial	sample.	Neither	they,	nor	their	distribution	𝐺(𝛽)	is	identified	from	an	RCT;	because	RCTs	make	so	few	as-sumptions	which,	in	many	cases,	is	their	strength,	they	can	identify	only	the	mean	of	the	distribution.	In	many	observational	studies,	researchers	are	prepared	to	make	more	assumptions	on	functional	forms	or	on	distributions,	and	for	that	price	we	are	
	 20	
able	to	identify	other	quantities	of	interest.	Without	these	assumptions,	inferences	must	be	based	on	the	difference	in	the	two	means,	a	statistic	that	is	sometimes	ill-behaved,	as	we	shall	discuss	below.	This	ill-behavior	has	nothing	to	do	with	RCTs,	per	se,	but	within	RCTs,	and	their	minimal	assumptions,	we	cannot	easily	switch	from	the	mean	to	some	other	quantity	of	interest.		 Fisher	proposed	that	statistical	inference	should	be	done	using	what	has	be-come	known	as	“randomization”	inference,	a	procedure	that	is	as	non-parametric	as	the	RCT-based	estimate	of	an	ATE	itself.	To	test	the	null	hypothesis	that	𝛽( = 0	for	all	i,	note	that,	under	the	null	that	the	treatment	has	no	effect	on	any	individual,	an	estimated	nonzero	ATE	must	be	a	consequence	of	the	particular	random	allocation	that	generated	it.	By	tabulating	all	possible	combinations	of	treatments	and	controls	in	our	trial	sample,	and	the	ATE	associated	with	each,	we	can	calculate	the	exact	dis-tribution	of	the	estimated	ATE	under	the	null.	This	allows	us	to	calculate	the	proba-bility	of	calculating	an	estimate	as	large	as	our	actual	estimate	when	there	are	no	ef-fects	of	treatment.	This	randomization	test	requires	a	finite	sample,	but	it	will	work	for	any	sample	size	(see	Imbens	and	Wooldridge	(2009)	for	an	excellent	account	of	the	procedure).	Imbens	(2010)	argues	that	it	is	this	randomization	inference	plus	the	unbiasedness	of	the	ATE	that	provides	the	twin	non-parametric	pillars	that	sup-port	placing	RCTs	at	the	“very	top”	of	the	hierarchy	of	evidence.			 Randomization	inference	can	be	used	for	null	hypotheses	that	specify	that	all	of	the	treatment	effects	are	zero,	as	in	the	above	example,	but	it	cannot	be	used	to	test	the	hypothesis	that	the	average	treatment	effect	is	zero,	which	will	often	be	of	interest.	In	agricultural	trials,	and	in	medicine,	the	stronger	(sharp)	hypothesis	that	the	treatment	has	no	effect	whatever	is	often	of	interest.	In	many	economic	applica-tions	that	involve	money,	such	as	welfare	experiments	or	cost-benefit	analyses,	we	are	interested	in	whether	the	net	effect	of	the	treatment	is	positive	or	negative,	and	in	these	cases,	randomization	inference	cannot	be	used.	None	of	which	argues	against	its	wider	use	in	social	sciences	when	appropriate.		 In	cases	where	randomization	inference	cannot	be	used,	we	must	construct	tests	for	the	differences	in	two	means.	Standard	procedures	will	often	work	well,	but	there	are	two	potential	pitfalls.	One,	the	‘Fisher-Behrens	problem’,	comes	from	the	
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fact	that,	when	the	two	samples	have	different	variances—which	we	typically	want	to	permit—the	usual	t-statistic	does	not	have	the	t-distribution.	The	second	prob-lem,	which	is	much	harder	to	address,	occurs	when	the	distribution	of	treatment	ef-fects	is	not	symmetric	(Bahadur	and	Savage	(1956)).	Neither	pitfall	is	specific	to	RCTs,	but	RCTs	force	us	to	work	with	means	in	estimating	treatment	effects	and,	with	only	a	very	few	exceptions	in	the	literature,	social	scientists	who	use	RCTs	ap-pear	to	be	unaware	of	the	difficulties.		 In	the	simple	case	of	comparing	two	means	in	an	RCT	without	covariates,	in-ference	is	usually	based	on	the	two–sample	t–statistic	which	is	computed	by	divid-ing	the	ATE	by	the	estimated	standard	error	whose	square	is	given	by	𝜎4 = 𝑛" − 1 6" 𝑌( − 𝑌"(7" 4𝑛" +	 𝑛& − 1 6" 𝑌( − 𝑌&(7& 4𝑛& 3 	where	0	refers	to	controls	and	1	to	treatments,	so	that	there	are	𝑛"	treatments	and	𝑛&	controls,	and	𝑌"and	𝑌&are	the	two	means.	As	has	long	been	known,	the	“t-statis-tic”	based	on	(3)	is	not	distributed	as	Student’s	t	if	the	two	variances	(treatment	and	control)	are	not	identical	but	has	the	Behrens–Fisher	distribution.	In	extreme	cases,	when	one	of	the	variances	is	zero,	the	t–statistic	has	effective	degrees	of	freedom	half	of	that	of	the	nominal	degrees	of	freedom,	so	that	the	test-statistic	has	thicker	tails	than	allowed	for,	and	there	will	be	too	many	rejections	when	the	null	is	true.		Young	(2016)	argues	that	this	problem	is	worse	when	the	trial	results	are	an-alyzed	by	regressing	outcomes	not	only	on	the	treatment	dummy	but	also	on	addi-tional	controls	and	when	using	clustered	or	robust	standard	errors.	When	the	de-sign	matrix	is	such	that	the	maximal	influence	is	large,	so	that	for	some	observations	outcomes	have	large	influence	on	their	own	predicted	values,	there	is	a	reduction	in	the	effective	degrees	of	freedom	for	the	t–value(s)	of	the	average	treatment	effect(s)	leading	to	spurious	findings	of	significance.	Young	looks	at	2,003	regressions	re-ported	in	53	RCT	papers	in	the	American	Economic	Association	journals	and	recalcu-lates	the	significance	of	the	estimates	using	randomization	inference	applied	to	the	authors’	original	data.	In	30	to	40	percent	of	the	estimated	treatment	effects	in	indi-vidual	equations	with	coefficients	that	are	reported	as	significant,	he	cannot	reject	the	null	of	no	effect	for	any	observation;	the	fraction	of	spuriously	significant	results	
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increases	further	when	he	simultaneously	tests	for	all	results	in	each	paper.		These	spurious	findings	come	in	part	from	issues	of	multiple-hypothesis	testing,	both	within	regressions	with	several	treatments	and	across	regressions.	Within	regres-sions,	treatments	are	largely	orthogonal,	but	authors	tend	to	emphasize	significant	
t–values	even	when	the	corresponding	F-tests	are	insignificant.	Across	equations,	results	are	often	strongly	correlated,	so	that,	at	worst,	different	regressions	are	re-porting	variants	of	the	same	result,	thus	spuriously	adding	to	the	“kill	count”	of	sig-nificant	effects.	At	the	same	time,	the	pervasiveness	of	observations	with	high	influ-ence	generates	spurious	significance	on	its	own.	These	issues	are	now	being	taken	more	seriously.	In	addition	to	Young	(2016),	Imbens	and	Kolesár	(2016)	provide	practical	advice	for	dealing	with	the	Fisher-Behrens	problem,	and	the	best	current	practice	tries	to	be	careful	about	mul-tiple	hypothesis	testing.	Yet	it	remains	the	case	that	many	of	the	results	in	the	litera-ture	are	spuriously	significant.	Spurious	significance	also	arises	when	the	distribution	of	treatment	effects	contains	outliers	or,	more	generally,	is	not	symmetric.	Standard	t–tests	break	down	in	distributions	with	enough	skewness	(see	Lehmann	and	Romano	(2005,	p.	466–8)).	How	difficult	is	it	to	maintain	symmetry?	And	how	badly	is	inference	affected	when	the	distribution	of	treatment	effects	is	not	symmetric?	In	economics,	many	tri-als	have	outcomes	valued	in	money.	Does	an	anti-poverty	innovation—for	example	microfinance—increase	the	incomes	of	the	participants?	Income	itself	is	not	sym-metrically	distributed,	and	this	might	be	true	of	the	treatment	effects	too	if	there	are	a	few	people	who	are	talented	but	credit-constrained	entrepreneurs	and	who	have	treatment	effects	that	are	large	and	positive,	while	the	vast	majority	of	borrowers	fritter	away	their	loans,	or	at	best	make	positive	but	modest	profits.	A	recent	sum-mary	of	the	literature	is	consistent	with	this	(see	Banerjee,	Karlan,	and	Zinman	(2015)).	Another	important	example	is	expenditures	on	healthcare.	Most	people	have	zero	expenditure	in	any	given	period,	but	among	those	who	do	incur	expendi-tures,	a	few	individuals	spend	huge	amounts	that	account	for	a	large	share	of	the	to-tal.	Indeed,	in	the	famous	Rand	health	experiment	(see	Manning,	Newhouse	et	al.	
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(1987,	1988)),	there	is	a	single	very	large	outlier.	The	authors	realize	that	the	com-parison	of	means	across	treatment	arms	is	fragile,	and,	although	they	do	not	see	their	problem	exactly	as	described	here,	they	obtain	their	preferred	estimates	using	a	structural	approach	that	is	explicitly	designed	to	model	the	skewness	of	expendi-tures.			 In	some	cases,	it	will	be	appropriate	to	deal	with	outliers	by	trimming,	trans-forming,	or	eliminating	observations	that	have	large	effects	on	the	estimates.	But	if	the	experiment	is	a	project	evaluation	designed	to	estimate	the	net	benefits	of	a	pol-icy,	the	elimination	of	genuine	outliers,	as	in	the	Rand	Health	Experiment,	will	viti-ate	the	analysis.	It	is	precisely	the	outliers	that	make	or	break	the	program.	Trans-formations,	such	as	taking	logarithms,	may	help	to	produce	symmetry,	but	they	change	the	nature	of	the	question	being	asked;	a	cost	benefit	analysis	must	be	done	in	dollars,	not	log	dollars.		 We	consider	an	example	that	illustrates	what	can	happen	in	a	realistic	but	simplified	case;	the	full	results	are	reported	in	the	Appendix.	We	imagine	a	popula-tion	of	individuals,	each	with	a	treatment	effect	𝛽( .	The	parent	population	mean	of	the	treatment	effects	is	zero,	but	there	is	a	long	tail	of	positive	values;	we	use	a	left-shifted	lognormal	distribution.	We	have	a	microfinance	trial	in	mind,	where	there	is	a	long	positive	tail	of	rare	individuals	who	can	do	amazing	things	with	credit	while	most	people	cannot	use	it	effectively.	A	trial	sample	of	2n 	individuals	is	randomly	drawn	from	the	parent	population	and	is	randomly	split	between	n	treatments	and	
n	controls.	Within	each	trial	sample,	whose	true	ATE	will	generally	differ	from	zero	because	of	the	sampling,	we	run	many	RCTs	and	tabulate	the	values	of	the	ATE	for	each.		 Using	standard	t-tests,	the	(true	in	the	parent	distribution)	hypothesis	that	the	ATE	is	zero	is	rejected	between	14	(𝑛 = 25)	and	6	percent	(𝑛 = 500)	of	the	time.	These	rejections	come	from	two	separate	issues,	both	of	which	are	relevant	in	prac-tice;	(a)	that	the	ATE	in	trial	sample	differs	from	the	ATE	in	the	parent	population	of	interest,	and	(b)	that	the	t-values	are	not	distributed	as	t	in	the	presence	of	outliers.	
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The	problem	cases	are	when	the	trial	sample	happens	to	contain	one	or	more	outli-ers,	something	that	is	always	a	risk	given	the	long	positive	tail	of	the	parent	distribu-tion.	When	this	happens,	everything	depends	on	whether	the	outlier	is	among	the	treatments	or	the	controls;	in	effect,	the	outliers	become	the	sample,	reducing	the	effective	number	of	degrees	of	freedom.	In	extreme	cases,	one	of	which	is	illustrated	in	Figure	A.1,	the	distribution	of	estimated	ATEs	is	bimodal,	depending	on	the	group	to	which	the	outlier	is	assigned.	When	the	outlier	is	in	the	treatment	group,	the	dis-persion	across	outcomes	is	large,	as	is	the	estimated	standard	error,	and	so	those	outcomes	rarely	reject	the	null	using	the	standard	table	of	t–values.	The	over-rejec-tions	come	from	cases	when	the	outlier	is	in	the	control	group,	the	outcomes	are	not	so	dispersed,	and	the	t–values	can	be	large,	negative,	and	significant.	While	these	cases	of	bimodal	distributions	may	not	be	common	and	depend	on	the	existence	of	large	outliers,	they	illustrate	the	process	that	generates	the	over-rejections	and	spu-rious	significance.	Note	that	there	is	no	remedy	through	randomization	inference	here,	given	that	our	interest	is	in	the	hypothesis	that	the	average	treatment	effect	is	zero.		 Our	reading	of	the	literature	on	RCTs	in	development	economics	suggests	that	they	are	not	exempt	from	these	concerns.	Many	development	trials	are	run	on	(sometimes	very)	small	samples,	they	have	treatment	effects	where	asymmetry	is	hard	to	rule	out—especially	when	the	outcomes	are	in	money—and	they	often	give	results	that	are	puzzling,	or	at	least	not	easily	interpreted	in	terms	of	economic	the-ory.	Neither	Banerjee	and	Duflo	(2012)	nor	Karlan	and	Appel	(2011),	who	cite	many	RCTs,	raise	concerns	about	misleading	inference,	implicitly	treating	all	results	as	re-liable.	No	doubt	there	are	behaviors	in	the	world	that	are	inconsistent	with	standard	economics,	and	some	can	be	explained	by	standard	biases	in	behavioral	economics,	but	it	would	also	be	good	to	be	suspicious	of	the	significance	tests	before	accepting	that	an	unexpected	finding	is	well-supported	and	that	theory	must	be	revised.	Repli-cation	of	results	in	different	settings	may	be	helpful,	if	they	are	the	right	kind	of	places	(see	our	discussion	in	Section	2).	Yet	it	hardly	solves	the	problem	given	that	the	asymmetry	may	be	in	the	same	direction	in	different	settings,	that	it	seems	likely	to	be	so	in	just	those	settings	that	are	sufficiently	like	the	original	trial	setting	to	be	
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of	use	for	inference	about	the	population	of	interest,	and	that	the	“significant”	t–val-ues	will	show	departures	from	the	null	in	the	same	direction.	This,	then,	replicates	the	spurious	findings.		
A	summary	What	do	the	arguments	of	this	section	mean	about	the	importance	of	randomization	and	the	interpretation	that	should	be	given	to	an	estimated	ATE	from	a	randomized	trial?	First,	we	should	be	sure	that	an	unbiased	estimate	of	an	ATE	for	the	trial	popu-lation	is	likely	to	be	useful	enough	to	warrant	the	costs	of	running	the	trial.	Second,	since	randomization	does	not	ensure	orthogonality,	care	must	be	taken	(e.g.	by	blinding)	that	there	are	no	significant	post-randomization	correlates	with	the	treat-ment.	This	is	a	well-known	lesson	but	many	social	and	economic	trials	are	not	blinded	and	insufficient	defense	is	offered	that	unbiasedness	is	not	undermined.		In-deed,	lack	of	blinding	is	not	the	only	source	of	post-randomization	bias.	Treatments	and	controls	may	be	handled	in	different	places,	or	by	differently	trained	practition-ers,	or	at	different	times	of	day,	and	these	differences	can	bring	with	them	system-atic	differences	in	the	other	causes	to	which	the	two	groups	are	exposed.	These	can,	and	should,	be	guarded	against.	But	doing	so	requires	an	understanding	of	what	these	causally	relevant	factors	might	be.	Third,	the	inference	problems	reviewed	here	cannot	just	be	presumed	away.	When	there	is	substantial	heterogeneity,	the	ATE	in	the	trial	sample	can	be	quite	different	from	the	ATE	in	the	population	of	in-terest,	even	if	the	trial	is	randomly	selected	from	that	population;	in	practice,	the	re-lationship	between	the	trial	sample	and	the	population	is	often	obscure.		Beyond	that,	in	many	cases,	the	statistical	inference	will	be	fine,	but	serious	attention	should	be	given	to	the	possibility	that	there	are	outliers	in	treatment	ef-fects,	something	that	knowledge	of	the	problem	can	suggest	and	where	inspection	of	the	marginal	distributions	of	treatments	and	controls	may	be	informative.	For	exam-ple,	if	both	are	symmetric,	it	seems	unlikely	(though	certainly	not	impossible)	that	the	treatment	effects	are	highly	skewed.	Measures	to	deal	with	Fisher-Behrens	should	be	used	and	randomization	inference	considered	when	appropriate	to	the	hypothesis	of	interest.		
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All	of	this	can	be	regarded	as	recommendations	for	improvement	to	current	practice,	not	a	challenge	to	it.	More	fundamentally,	we	strongly	contest	the	often-ex-pressed	idea	that	the	ATE	calculated	from	an	RCT	is	automatically	reliable,	that	ran-domization	automatically	controls	for	unobservables,	or	worst	of	all,	that	the	calcu-lated	ATE	is	true.	If,	by	chance,	it	is	close	to	the	truth,	the	truth	we	are	referring	to	is	the	truth	in	the	trial	sample	only.	To	make	any	inference	beyond	that	requires	an	ar-gument	of	the	kind	we	consider	in	the	next	section.	We	have	also	argued	that,	de-pending	on	what	we	are	trying	to	measure	and	what	we	want	to	use	that	measure	for,	there	is	no	presumption	that	an	RCT	is	the	best	means	of	estimating	it.	That	too	requires	an	argument,	not	a	presumption.		
Section	2:	Using	the	results	of	randomized	controlled	trials	2.1	Introduction	Suppose	we	have	estimated	an	ATE	from	a	well-conducted	RCT	on	a	trial	sample,	and	our	standard	error	gives	us	reason	to	believe	that	the	effect	did	not	come	about	by	chance.	We	thus	have	good	warrant	that	the	treatment	causes	the	effect	in	our	trial	sample,	up	to	the	limits	of	statistical	inference.	What	are	such	findings	good	for?		The	literature	in	economics,	as	indeed	in	medicine	and	in	social	policy,	has	paid	more	attention	to	obtaining	results	than	to	considering	what	can	be	done	with	them.	There	is	little	theoretical	or	empirical	work	to	guide	us	how	and	for	what	pur-poses	to	use	the	findings	of	RCTs,	such	as	the	conditions	under	which	the	same	re-sults	hold	outside	of	the	original	settings,	how	they	might	be	adapted	for	use	else-where,	or	how	they	might	be	used	for	formulating,	testing,	understanding,	or	prob-ing	hypotheses	beyond	the	immediate	relation	between	the	treatment	and	the	out-come	investigated	in	the	study.	Yet	it	cannot	be	that	knowing	how	to	use	results	is	less	important	than	knowing	how	to	demonstrate	them.	Any	chain	of	evidence	is	only	as	strong	as	it	weakest	link,	so	that	a	rigorously	established	effect	whose	applicabil-ity	is	justified	by	a	loose	declaration	of	simile	warrants	little.	If	trials	are	to	be	useful,	we	need	paths	to	their	use	that	are	as	carefully	constructed	as	are	the	trials	them-selves.		 The	argument	for	the	“primacy	of	internal	validity”	made	by	Shadish,	Cook,	and	Campbell	(2002)	may	be	reasonable	as	a	warning	that	bad	RCTs	are	unlikely	to	
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generalize,	but	it	is	sometimes	incorrectly	taken	to	imply	that	results	of	an	internally	valid	trial	will	automatically,	or	often,	apply	‘as	is’	elsewhere,	or	that	this	should	be	the	default	assumption	failing	arguments	to	the	contrary,	as	if	a	parameter,	once	well	established,	can	be	expected	to	be	invariant	across	settings.	An	invariance	as-sumption	is	often	made	in	medicine,	for	example,	where	it	is	sometimes	plausible	that	a	particular	procedure	or	drug	works	the	same	way	everywhere	(though	see	Horton	(2000)	for	a	strong	dissent	and	Rothwell	(2005)	for	examples	on	both	sides	of	the	question).	We	should	also	note	the	recent	movement	to	ensure	that	testing	of	drugs	includes	women	and	minorities	because	members	of	those	groups	suppose	that	the	results	of	trials	on	mostly	healthy	young	white	males	do	not	apply	to	them.		2.2	Using	results,	transportability,	and	external	validity	Suppose	a	trial	has	established	a	result	in	a	specific	setting.		If	`the	same’	result	holds	elsewhere,	it	is	said	to	have	`external	validity’.	External	validity	may	refer	just	to	the	transportability	of	the	causal	connection,	or	go	further	and	require	replication	of	the	magnitude	of	the	ATE.	Either	way,	the	result	holds—everywhere,	or	widely,	or	in	some	specific	elsewhere—or	it	does	not.		This	binary	concept	of	external	validity	is	often	unhelpful	because	it	asks	the	results	of	an	RCT	to	satisfy	a	condition	that	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	a	trial	to	be	useful,	and	so	both	overstates	and	understates	their	value.	It	directs	us	to-ward	simple	extrapolation—whether	the	same	result	holds	elsewhere—or	simple	generalization—it	holds	universally	or	at	least	widely—and	away	from	more	com-plex	but	more	useful	applications	of	the	results.	The	failure	of	external	validity	inter-preted	as	simple	generalization	or	extrapolation	says	little	about	the	value	of	the	trial.		 First,	there	are	several	uses	of	RCTs	that	do	not	require	transportability	be-yond	the	original	context;	we	discuss	these	in	the	next	subsection.	Second,	there	are	often	good	reasons	to	expect	that	the	results	from	a	well-conducted,	informative,	and	potentially	useful	RCT	will	not	apply	elsewhere	in	any	simple	way.	Without	fur-ther	understanding	and	analysis,	even	successful	replication	tells	us	little	either	for	or	against	simple	generalization	or	to	support	for	the	conclusion	that	the	next	will	work	in	the	same	way.	Nor	do	failures	of	replication	make	the	original	result	useless.	
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We	often	learn	much	from	coming	to	understand	why	replication	failed	and	can	use	that	knowledge,	in	looking	for	how	the	factors	that	caused	the	original	result	might	operate	differently	in	different	settings.	Third,	and	particularly	important	for	scien-tific	progress,	the	RCT	result	can	be	incorporated	into	a	network	of	evidence	and	hy-potheses	that	test	or	explore	claims	that	look	very	different	from	the	results	re-ported	from	the	RCT.	We	shall	give	examples	below	of	extremely	useful	RCTs	that	are	not	externally	valid	in	the	(usual)	sense	that	their	results	do	not	hold	elsewhere,	whether	in	a	specific	target	setting	or	in	the	more	sweeping	sense	of	holding	every-where.	Bertrand	Russell’s	chicken	(Russell	(1912))	provides	an	excellent	example	of	the	limitations	to	straightforward	extrapolation	from	repeated	successful	replica-tion.	The	bird	infers,	on	repeated	evidence,	that	when	the	farmer	comes	in	the	morning,	he	feeds	her.	The	inference	serves	her	well	until	Christmas	morning,	when	he	wrings	her	neck	and	serves	her	for	dinner.	Though	this	chicken	did	not	base	her	inference	on	an	RCT,	had	we	constructed	one	for	her,	we	would	have	obtained	the	same	result	that	she	did.	Her	problem	was	not	her	methodology,	but	rather	that	she	did	not	understand	the	social	and	economic	structure	that	gave	rise	to	the	causal	re-lations	that	she	observed.		So,	establishing	causality	does	nothing	in	and	of	itself	to	guarantee	generali-
zability.	Nor	does	the	ability	of	an	ideal	RCT	to	eliminate	bias	from	selection	or	from	omitted	variables	mean	that	the	resulting	ATE	from	the	trial	sample	will	apply	any-where	else.		The	issue	is	worth	mentioning	only	because	of	the	enormous	weight	that	is	currently	attached	in	economics	to	the	discovery	and	labeling	of	causal	rela-tions,	a	weight	that	is	hard	to	justify	for	effects	that	may	have	only	local	applicabil-ity,	what	might	be	labeled	‘anecdotal	causality’.	The	operation	of	a	cause	generally	requires	the	presence	of	“support	factors”,	without	which	a	cause	that	produces	the	targeted	effect	in	one	place,	even	though	it	may	be	present	and	have	the	capacity	to	operate	elsewhere,	will	remain	latent	and	inoperative.	What	Mackie	(1974)	called	INUS	causality	(Insufficient	but	Non-redundant	parts	of	a	condition	that	is	itself	Un-necessary	but	Sufficient	for	a	contribution	to	the	outcome)	is	often	the	kind	of	cau-sality	we	see.	A	standard	example	is	a	house	burning	down	because	the	television	
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was	left	on,	although	televisions	do	not	operate	in	this	way	without	support	factors,	such	as	wiring	faults,	the	presence	of	tinder,	and	so	on.	This	is	standard	fare	in	epi-demiology,	which	uses	the	term	`causal	pie’	to	refer	to	a	set	of	causes	that	are	jointly	but	not	separately	sufficient	for	an	effect.		If	we	rewrite	(1)	in	the	form	
𝑌( = 𝛽(𝑇( + 𝛾<𝑥(< = 𝜃 𝑤( 𝑇(@<A" + 𝛾<𝑥(<
@
<A" (4)	where	the	function	𝜃(. )	controls	how	a	k-vector	𝑤( 	of	k	`support	factors’	affect	indi-vidual	i’s	treatment	effect	𝛽( .	The	support	factors	may	include	some	of	the	x’s.	Since	the	ATE	is	the	average	of	the	𝛽(𝑠,	two	populations	will	have	the	same	ATE	if	and	only	if	they	have	the	same	average	for	the	net	effect	of	the	support	factors	necessary	for	the	treatment	to	work,	i.e.	for	the	quantity	in	front	of	𝑇( .	These	are	however	just	the	kind	of	factors	that	are	likely	to	be	differently	distributed	in	different	populations,	and	indeed	we	do	generally	find	different	ATEs	in	different	economic	(and	other	so-cial	policy)	RCTs	in	different	places	even	in	the	cases	where	(unusually)	they	all	point	in	the	same	direction.	Causal	processes	often	require	highly	specialized	economic,	cultural,	or	social	structures	to	enable	them	to	work.	Consider	the	Rube	Goldberg	machine	that	is	rigged	up	so	that	flying	a	kite	sharpens	a	pencil	(Cartwright	and	Hardie	(2012,	77)).	The	underlying	structure	affords	a	very	specific	form	of	(4)	that	will	not	describe	causal	processes	elsewhere.		Neither	the	same	ATE	nor	the	same	qualitative	causal	relations	can	be	expected	to	hold	where	the	specific	form	for	(4)	is	different.	Indeed,	we	continually	attempt	to	design	systems	that	will	generate	causal	relations	that	we	like	and	that	will	rule	out	causal	relations	that	we	do	not	like.	Healthcare	systems	are	designed	to	prevent	nurses	and	doctors	making	errors;	cars	are	designed	so	that	drivers	cannot	start	them	in	reverse;	work	schedules	for	pilots	are	designed	so	they	do	not	fly	too	many	consecutive	hours	without	rest	because	alertness	and	perfor-mance	are	compromised.	
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As	in	the	Rube	Goldberg	machine	and	in	the	design	of	cars	and	work	sched-ules,	the	economic	structure	and	equilibrium	may	differ	in	ways	that	support	differ-ent	kinds	of	causal	relations	and	thus	render	a	trial	in	one	setting	useless	in	another.	For	example,	a	trial	that	relies	on	providing	incentives	for	personal	promotion	is	of	no	use	in	a	state	in	which	a	political	system	locks	people	into	their	social	and	eco-nomic	positions.	Cash	transfers	that	are	conditional	on	parents	taking	their	children	to	clinics	cannot	improve	child	health	in	the	absence	of	functioning	clinics.	Policies	targeted	at	men	may	not	work	for	women.	We	use	a	lever	to	toast	our	bread,	but	lev-ers	only	operate	to	toast	bread	in	a	toaster;	we	cannot	brown	toast	by	pressing	an	accelerator,	even	if	the	principle	of	the	lever	is	the	same	in	both	a	toaster	and	a	car.	If	we	misunderstand	the	setting,	if	we	do	not	understand	why	the	treatment	in	our	RCT	works,	we	run	the	same	risks	as	Russell’s	chicken.		2.3	When	RCTs	speak	for	themselves:	no	transportability	required	For	some	things	we	want	to	learn,	an	RCT	is	enough	by	itself.	An	RCT	may	provide	a	counterexample	to	a	general	theoretical	proposition,	either	to	the	proposition	itself	(a	simple	refutation	test)	or	to	some	consequence	of	it	(a	complex	refutation	test).	An	RCT	may	also	confirm	a	prediction	of	a	theory,	and	although	this	does	not	con-firm	the	theory,	it	is	evidence	in	its	favor,	especially	if	the	prediction	seems	inher-ently	unlikely	in	advance.	This	is	all	familiar	territory,	and	there	is	nothing	unique	about	an	RCT;	it	is	simply	one	among	many	possible	testing	procedures.	Even	when	there	is	no	theory,	or	very	weak	theory,	an	RCT,	by	demonstrating	causality	in	some	population	can	be	thought	of	as	proof	of	concept,	that	the	treatment	is	capable	of	working	somewhere.	This	is	one	of	the	arguments	for	the	importance	of	internal	va-lidity.		Nor	is	transportation	called	for	when	an	RCT	is	used	for	evaluation,	for	exam-ple	to	satisfy	donors	that	the	project	they	funded	achieved	its	aims	in	the	population	in	which	it	was	conducted.	Even	so,	for	such	evaluations,	say	by	the	World	Bank,	to	be	global	public	goods	requires	arguments	and	guidelines	that	justify	using	the	re-sults	in	some	way	elsewhere;	the	global	public	good	is	not	an	automatic	by-product	of	the	Bank	fulfilling	its	fiduciary	responsibility.	When	the	components	of	treat-ments	change	across	studies,	evaluations	need	not	lead	to	cumulative	knowledge.	Or	
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as	Heckman	et	al	(1999,	1934)	note,	“the	data	produced	from	them	[social	experi-ments]	are	far	from	ideal	for	estimating	the	structural	parameters	of	behavioral	models.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	generalize	findings	across	experiments	or	to	use	experiments	to	identify	the	policy-invariant	structural	parameters	that	are	required	for	econometric	policy	evaluation.”		Of	course,	when	we	ask	exactly	what	those	invariant	structural	parameters	are,	whether	they	exist,	and	how	they	should	be	modeled,	we	open	up	major	fault	lines	in	modern	applied	economics.	For	example,	we	do	not	intend	to	endorse	inter-temporal	dynamic	models	of	behavior	as	the	only	way	of	recovering	the	parameters	that	we	need.	We	also	recognize	that	the	usefulness	of	simple	price	theory	is	not	as	universally	accepted	as	it	once	was.	But	the	point	remains	that	we	need	something,	some	regularity	or	some	invariance,	and	that	something	can	rarely	be	recovered	by	simply	generalizing	across	trials.		A	third	non-problematic	and	important	use	of	an	RCT	is	when	the	parameter	of	interest	is	the	ATE	in	a	well-defined	population	from	which	the	trial	sample	is	it-self	a	random	sample.	In	this	case	the	sample	average	treatment	effect	(SATE)	is	an	unbiased	estimator	of	the	population	average	treatment	effect	(PATE)	that,	by	as-sumption,	is	our	target	(see	Imbens	(2004)	for	these	terms).	We	refer	to	this	as	the	`public	health’	case;	like	many	public	health	interventions,	the	target	is	the	average,	`population	health,’	not	the	health	of	individuals.		One	major	(and	widely	recog-nized)	danger	of	this	use	of	RCTs	is	that	scaling	up	from	(even	a	random)	sample	to	the	population	will	not	go	through	in	any	simple	way	if	the	outcomes	of	individuals	or	groups	of	individuals	change	the	behavior	of	others—which	will	be	common	in	economic	examples	but	perhaps	less	so	in	health.	There	is	also	an	issue	of	timing	if	time	elapses	between	the	trial	and	the	implementation.		In	economics,	a	`public-health-style’	example	is	the	imposition	of	a	commod-ity	tax,	where	the	total	tax	revenue	is	of	interest	and	policymakers	do	not	care	who	pays	the	tax.	Indeed,	theory	can	often	identify	a	specific,	well-defined	quantity	whose	measurement	is	key	for	a	policy	(see	Deaton	and	Ng	(1998)	for	an	example	of	what	Chetty	(2009)	calls	a	“sufficient”	statistic).	In	this	case,	the	behavior	of	a	ran-dom	sample	of	individuals	might	well	provide	a	good	guide	to	the	tax	revenue	that	
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can	be	expected.	Another	case	comes	from	work	on	poverty	programs	where	the	sponsors	are	most	concerned	about	the	budget;	we	discuss	these	cases	at	the	end	of	this	Section.	Even	here,	it	is	easy	to	imagine	behavioral	effects	coming	into	play	that	drive	a	wedge	between	the	trial	and	its	full-scale	implementation,	for	example	if	compliance	is	higher	when	the	scheme	is	widely	publicized,	or	if	government	agen-cies	implement	the	scheme	differently	from	trialists.		2.4	Transporting	results	laterally	and	globally	The	program	of	RCTs	in	economics,	as	in	other	areas	of	social	science,	has	the	broader	goal	of	finding	out	`what	works.’	At	its	most	ambitious,	this	aims	for	univer-sal	reach,	and	the	development	economics	literature	frequently	argues	that	“credi-ble	impact	evaluations	are	global	public	goods	in	the	sense	that	they	can	offer	relia-ble	guidance	to	international	organizations,	governments,	donors,	and	nongovern-mental	organizations	(NGOs)	beyond	national	borders”,	Duflo	and	Kremer	(2008,	93).	Sometimes	the	results	of	a	single	RCT	are	advocated	as	having	wide	applicabil-ity,	with	especially	strong	endorsement	when	there	is	at	least	one	replication.	For	example,	Kremer	and	Holla	(2009,	3)	use	a	Kenyan	trial	as	the	basis	for	a	blanket	statement	without	specifying	context,	“Provision	of	free	school	uniforms,	for	exam-ple,	leads	to	10%-15%	reductions	in	teen	pregnancy	and	dropout	rates.”	Duflo	and	Kremer	(2008,	104),	writing	about	another	trial,	are	more	cautious,	citing	two	eval-uations	and	restricting	themselves	to	India:	“One	can	be	relatively	confident	about	recommending	the	scaling-up	of	this	program,	at	least	in	India,	on	the	basis	of	these	estimates,	since	the	program	was	continued	for	a	period	of	time,	was	evaluated	in	two	different	contexts,	and	has	shown	its	ability	to	be	rolled	out	on	a	large	scale.”	Even	a	number	of	replications	do	not	provide	a	sound	basis	for	inference.	Without	theory	to	support	the	projection	of	results,	this	is	just	induction	by	simple	enumera-tion—swan	1	is	white,	swan	2	is	white,	.	.	.	,	so	all	swans	are	white.		The	problem	of	generalization	extends	beyond	RCTs,	to	both	`fully	con-trolled’	laboratory	experiments	and	to	most	non-experimental	findings.	Our	argu-ment	here	is	that	evidence	from	RCTs	is	not	automatically	simply	generalizable,	and	that	its	superior	internal	validity,	if	and	when	it	exists,	does	not	provide	it	with	any	unique	invariance	across	context.	That	transportation	is	far	from	automatic	also	
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tells	us	why	(even	ideal)	RCTs	of	similar	interventions	give	different	answers	in	dif-ferent	settings.	Such	differences	do	not	necessarily	reflect	methodological	failings	and	will	hold	across	perfectly	executed	RCTs	just	as	they	do	across	observational	studies.		Many	advocates	of	RCTs	understand	that	`what	works’	needs	to	be	qualified	to	`what	works	under	which	circumstances’	and	try	to	say	something	about	what	those	circumstances	might	be,	for	example,	by	replicating	RCTs	in	different	places	and	thinking	intelligently	about	the	differences	in	outcomes	when	they	find	them.	Sometimes	this	is	done	in	a	systematic	way,	for	example	by	having	multiple	treat-ments	within	the	same	trial	so	that	it	is	possible	to	estimate	a	`response	surface’	that	links	outcomes	to	various	combinations	of	treatments	(see	Greenberg	and	Schroder	(2004)	or	Shadish	et	al	(2002)).	For	example,	the	RAND	health	experiment	had	mul-tiple	treatments,	allowing	investigation,	not	of	how	much	health	insurance	in-creased	expenditures	under	different	circumstances.	Some	of	the	negative	income	tax	experiments	(NITs)	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	were	designed	to	estimate	response	surfaces,	with	the	number	of	treatments	and	controls	in	each	arm	optimized	to	max-imize	precision	of	estimated	response	functions	subject	to	an	overall	cost	limit	(see	Conlisk	(1973)).	Experiments	on	time-of-day	pricing	for	electricity	had	a	similar	structure	(see	Aigner	(1985)).	The	experiments	by	MDRC	(originally	known	as	the	Manpower	Development	Research	Corporation)	have	also	been	analyzed	across	cities	in	an	effort	to	link	city	features	to	the	results	of	the	RCTs	within	them	(see	Bloom,	Hill,	and	Riccio	(2005)).	Unlike	the	RAND	and	NIT	examples,	these	are	ex	post	analyses	of	completed	trials;	the	same	is	true	of	Vivalt	(2015),	who	finds,	for	the	collection	of	trials	she	studied,	that	development-related	RCTs	run	by	government	agencies	typically	find	smaller	(standardized)	effect	sizes	than	RCTs	run	by	academics	or	by	NGOs.	Bold	et	al	(2013),	who	ran	parallel	RCTs	on	an	intervention	implemented	either	by	an	NGO	or	by	the	government	of	Kenya,	found	similar	results	there.	Note	that	these	analyses	have	a	different	purpose	from	meta-analyses	that	assume	that	different	trials	esti-mate	the	same	parameter	up	to	noise	and	average	in	order	to	increase	precision.	
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Although	there	are	issues	with	all	of	methods	of	investigating	differences	across	trials,	without	some	discipline	it	is	too	easy	to	come	up	with	`just-so’	or	fairy	stories	that	account	for	differences.	We	risk	a	procedure	that,	if	a	result	is	replicated	in	full	or	in	part	in	at	least	two	places,	puts	that	treatment	into	the	`it	works’	box	and,	if	the	result	does	not	replicate,	casually	interprets	the	difference	in	a	way	that	allows	at	least	some	of	the	findings	to	survive.	How	can	we	do	better	than	simple	generalization	and	simple	extrapolation?	Many	writers	emphasize	the	role	of	theory	in	transporting	and	using	the	results	of	trials,	and	we	shall	discuss	this	in	the	next	subsection.	But	statistical	approaches	are	also	widely	used;	these	are	designed	to	deal	with	the	possibility	that	treatment	ef-fects	vary	systematically	with	other	variables.	Referring	back	to	(4),	it	is	clear	that,	supposing	the	same	form	of	(4)	obtains,	if	the	distribution	of	the	w	values	is	the	same	in	the	new	circumstances	as	in	the	old,	the	ATE	in	the	original	trial	will	hold	in	the	new	circumstances.	In	general,	of	course,	this	condition	will	not	hold,	nor	do	we	have	any	obvious	way	of	checking	it	unless	we	know	what	the	support	factors	are	in	both	places.	One	procedure	to	deal	with	interactions	is	post-experimental	stratifica-
tion,	which	parallels	post-survey	stratification	in	sample	surveys.	The	trial	is	broken	up	into	subgroups	that	have	the	same	combination	of	known,	observable	w’s	(age,	race,	gender	for	example),	then	the	ATEs	within	each	of	the	subgroups	are	calcu-lated,	and	then	they	are	reassembled	according	to	the	configuration	of	w’s	in	the	new	context.	This	can	be	used	to	estimate	the	ATE	in	a	new	context,	or	to	correct	es-timates	to	the	parent	population	when	the	trial	sample	is	not	a	random	sample	of	the	parent.	Other	methods	can	be	used	when	there	are	too	many	w’s	for	stratifica-tion,	for	example	by	estimating	the	probability	of	each	observation	in	the	population	included	in	the	trial	sample	as	a	function	of	the	w’s,	then	weighting	each	observation	by	the	inverse	of	these	propensity	scores.	A	good	reference	for	these	methods	is	Stu-art	et	al	(2011),	or	in	economics,	Angrist	(2004)	and	Hotz,	Imbens,	and	Mortimer	(2005).	These	methods	are	often	not	applicable,	however.	First,	reweighting	works	only	when	the	observable	factors	used	for	reweighting	include	all	(and	only)	genu-ine	interactive	causes.	Second,	as	with	any	form	of	reweighting,	the	variables	used	to	
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construct	the	weights	must	be	present	in	both	the	original	and	new	context.	For	ex-ample,	if	we	are	to	carry	a	result	forward	in	time,	we	may	not	be	able	to	extrapolate	from	a	period	of	low	inflation	to	a	period	of	high	inflation.	As	Hotz	et	al	(2005)	note,	it	will	typically	be	necessary	to	rule	out	such	`macro’	effects,	whether	over	time,	or	over	locations.	Third,	it	also	depends	on	assuming	that	the	same	governing	equation	(4)	covers	the	trial	and	the	target	population.		Pearl	and	Bareinboim	(2011,	2014)	and	Bareinboim	and	Pearl	(2013,	2014)	provide	strategies	for	inferring	information	about	new	populations	from	trial	re-sults	that	are	more	general	than	reweighting.	They	suppose	we	have	available	both	causal	information	and	probabilistic	information	for	population	A	(e.g.	the	experi-mental	one),	while	for	population	B	(the	target)	we	have	only	(some)	probabilistic	information,	and	also	that	we	know	that	certain	probabilistic	and	causal	facts	are	shared	between	the	two	and	certain	ones	are	not.	They	offer	theorems	describing	what	causal	conclusions	about	population	B	are	thereby	fixed.	Their	work	under-lines	the	fact	that	exactly	what	conclusions	about	one	population	can	be	supported	by	information	about	another	depends	on	exactly	what	causal	and	probabilistic	facts	they	have	in	common. But	as	Muller	(2015)	notes,	this,	like	the	problem	with	simple	reweighting,	takes	us	back	to	the	situation	that	RCTs	are	designed	to	avoid,	where	we	need	to	start	from	a	complete	and	correct	specification	of	the	causal	structure.	RCTs	can	avoid	this	in	estimation—which	is	one	of	their	strengths,	supporting	their	credibility—but	the	benefit	vanishes	as	soon	as	we	try	to	carry	their	results	to	a	new	context.		This	discussion	leads	to	a	number	of	points.	First,	we	cannot	get	to	general	claims	by	simple	generalization;	there	is	no	warrant	for	the	convenient	assumption	that	the	ATE	estimated	in	a	specific	RCT	is	an	invariant	parameter,	nor	that	the	kinds	of	interventions	and	outcomes	we	measure	in	typical	RCTs	participate	in	gen-eral	causal	relations.	While	it	is	true	that	general	causal	claims	exist—	that	gravita-tional	masses	attract	each	other,	or	that	people	respond	to	incentives—these	use	relatively	abstract	concepts	and	operate	at	a	much	higher	level	than	the	claims	that	can	be	reasonably	inferred	from	a	typical	RCT.		
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Second,	thoughtful	pre-experimental	stratification	in	RCTs	is	likely	to	be	val-uable,	or	failing	that,	subgroup	analysis,	because	it	can	provide	information	that	may	be	useful	for	generalization	or	transportation.	For	example,	Kremer	and	Holla	(2009)	note	that,	in	their	trials,	school	attendance	is	surprisingly	sensitive	to	small	subsidies,	which	they	suggest	is	because	there	are	a	large	number	of	students	and	parents	who	are	on	the	(financial)	margin	between	attending	and	not	attending	school;	if	this	is	indeed	the	mechanism	for	their	results,	a	good	variable	for	stratifi-cation	would	be	distance	from	the	relevant	cutoff.	We	also	need	to	know	that	this	same	mechanism	works	in	any	new	target	setting.		Third,	we	need	to	be	explicit	about	causal	structure,	even	if	that	means	more	model	building	and	more—or	different—assumptions	than	advocates	of	RCTs	are	often	comfortable	with.	To	be	clear,	modeling	causal	structure	does	not	commit	us	to	the	elaborate	and	often	incredible	assumptions	that	characterize	some	structural	modeling	in	economics,	but	there	is	no	escape	from	thinking	about	the	way	things	work;	the	why	as	well	as	the	what.	Fourth,	we	will	typically	need	to	know	more	than	the	results	of	the	RCT	itself,	for	example	about	differences	in	social,	economic,	and	cultural	structures	and	about	the	joint	distributions	of	causal	variables,	knowledge	that	will	often	only	be	availa-ble	through	observational	studies.	We	will	also	need	external	information,	both	the-oretical	and	empirical,	to	settle	on	an	informative	characterization	of	the	population	enrolled	in	the	RCT	because	how	that	population	is	described	is	commonly	taken	to	be	some	indication	of	which	other	populations	the	results	are	likely	to	be	exportable	to.	Many	medical	and	psychological	journals	are	explicit	about	this.	For	instance,	the	rules	for	submission	recommended	by	the	International	Committee	of	Medical	Jour-nal	Editors,	ICMJE	(2015,	14)	insist	that	article	abstracts	“Clearly	describe	the	selec-tion	of	observational	or	experimental	participants	(healthy	individuals	or	patients,	including	controls),	including	eligibility	and	exclusion	criteria	and	a	description	of	the	source	population.”	An	RCT	is	conducted	on	a	specific	trial	sample,	somehow	drawn	from	a	population	of	specific	individuals.	The	results	obtained	are	features	of	that	sample,	of	those	very	individuals	at	that	very	time,	not	any	other	population	
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with	any	different	individuals	that	might,	for	example,	satisfy	one	of	the	infinite	set	of	descriptions	that	the	trial	sample	satisfies.	This	same	issue	is	confronted	already	in	study	design.	Apart	from	special	cases,	like	post	hoc	evaluation	for	payment-for-results,	we	are	not	especially	con-cerned	to	learn	about	the	very	individuals	enrolled	in	the	trial.	Most	experiments	are,	and	should	be,	conducted	with	an	eye	to	what	the	results	can	help	us	learn	about	other	populations.	This	cannot	be	done	without	substantial	assumptions	about	what	might	and	what	might	not	be	relevant	to	the	production	of	the	outcome	studied.	(For	example,	the	ICMJE	guidelines	(2015,	14)	go	on	to	say:	“Because	the	relevance	of	such	variables	as	age,	sex,	or	ethnicity	is	not	always	known	at	the	time	of	study	design,	researchers	should	aim	for	inclusion	of	representative	populations	into	all	study	types	and	at	a	minimum	provide	descriptive	data	for	these	and	other	relevant	demographic	variables,”	p14.)	So	both	intelligent	study	design	and	respon-sible	reporting	of	study	results	involve	substantial	background	assumptions.		Of	course,	this	is	true	for	all	studies.	But	RCTs	require	special	conditions	if	they	are	to	be	conducted	at	all	and	especially	if	they	are	to	be	conducted	success-fully—for	example,	local	agreements,	compliant	subjects,	affordable	administrators,	multiple	blinding,	people	competent	to	measure	and	record	outcomes	reliably,	a	set-ting	where	random	allocation	is	morally	and	politically	acceptable,	etc.—whereas	observational	data	are	often	more	readily	and	widely	available.	In	the	case	of	RCTs,	there	is	danger	that	these	kinds	of	considerations	have	too	much	effect.	This	is	espe-cially	worrisome	where	the	features	that	the	trial	sample	should	have	are	not	justi-fied,	made	explicit,	or	subjected	to	serious	critical	review.		The	need	for	observational	knowledge	is	one	of	many	reasons	why	it	is	coun-ter-productive	to	insist	that	RCTs	are	the	gold	standard	or	that	some	categories	of	evidence	should	be	prioritized	over	others;	these	strategies	leave	us	helpless	in	us-ing	RCTs	beyond	their	original	context.	The	results	of	RCTs	must	be	integrated	with	other	knowledge,	including	the	practical	wisdom	of	policymakers,	if	they	are	to	be	useable	outside	the	context	in	which	they	were	constructed.		
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Contrary	to	much	practice	in	medicine	as	well	as	in	economics,	conflicts	be-tween	RCTs	and	observational	results	need	to	be	explained,	for	example	by	refer-ence	to	the	different	populations	in	each,	a	process	that	will	sometimes	yield	im-portant	evidence,	including	on	the	range	of	applicability	of	the	RCT	results	them-selves.	While	the	validity	of	the	RCT	will	sometimes	provide	an	understanding	of	why	the	observational	study	found	a	different	answer,	there	is	no	basis	(or	excuse)	for	the	common	practice	of	dismissing	the	observational	study	simply	because	it	was	not	an	RCT	and	therefore	must	be	invalid.	It	is	a	basic	tenet	of	scientific	advance	that,	as	collective	knowledge	advances,	new	findings	must	be	able	to	explain	and	be	integrated	with	previous	results,	even	results	that	are	now	thought	to	be	invalid;	methodological	prejudice	is	not	an	explanation.		2.5	Using	theory	for	generalization	Economists	have	been	combining	theory	and	randomized	controlled	trials	since	the	early	experiments.	Orcutt	and	Orcutt	(1968)	laid	out	the	inspiration	for	the	income	tax	trials	using	a	simple	static	theory	of	labor	supply.	According	to	this,	people	choose	how	to	divide	their	time	between	work	and	leisure	in	an	environment	in	which	they	receive	a	minimum	G	if	they	do	not	work,	and	where	they	receive	an	ad-ditional	amount	(1-t)	w	for	each	hour	they	work,	where	w	is	the	wage	rate,	and	t	is	a	tax	rate.	The	trials	assigned	different	combinations	of	G	and	t	to	different	trial	groups,	so	that	the	results	traced	out	the	labor	supply	function,	allowing	estimation	of	the	parameters	of	preferences,	which	could	then	be	used	in	a	wide	range	of	policy	calculations,	for	example	to	raise	revenue	at	minimum	utility	loss	to	workers.			 Following	these	early	trials,	there	has	been	a	continuing	tradition	of	using	trial	results,	together	with	the	baseline	data	collected	for	the	trial,	to	fit	structural	models	that	are	to	be	used	more	generally.	Early	examples	include	Moffitt	(1979)	on	labor	supply	and	Wise	(1985)	on	housing;	a	more	recent	example	is	Heckman,	Pinto	and	Savelyev	(2013)	for	the	Perry	pre-school	program.	Development	economics	ex-amples	include	Attanasio,	Meghir,	and	Santiago	(2012),	Attanasio	et	al	(2015),	Todd	and	Wolpin	(2006),	Wolpin	(2013),	and	Duflo,	Hanna,	and	Ryan	(2012).		These	
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structural	models	sometimes	require	formidable	auxiliary	assumptions	on	func-tional	forms	or	the	distributions	of	unobservables,	but	they	have	compensating	ad-vantages,	including	the	ability	to	integrate	theory	and	evidence,	to	make	out-of-sam-ple	predictions,	and	to	analyze	welfare,	and	the	use	of	RCT	evidence	allows	the	re-laxation	of	at	least	some	of	the	assumptions	that	are	needed	for	identification.	In	this	way,	the	structural	models	borrow	credibility	from	the	RCTs	and	in	return	help	set	the	RCT	results	within	a	coherent	framework.	Without	some	such	interpretation,	the	welfare	implications	of	RCT	results	can	be	problematic;	knowing	how	people	in	gen-eral	(let	alone	just	people	in	the	trial	population)	respond	to	some	policy	is	rarely	enough	to	tell	whether	or	not	they	are	made	better	off,	Harrison	(2014a,	b).	Tradi-tional	welfare	economics	draws	a	link	from	preferences	to	behavior,	a	link	that	is	re-spected	in	structural	work	but	often	lost	in	the	`what	works’	literature,	and	without	which	we	have	no	basis	for	inferring	welfare	from	behavior.	What	works	is	not	equivalent	to	what	should	be.		 Light	touch	theory	can	do	much	to	interpret,	to	extend,	and	to	use	RCT	re-sults.	In	both	the	RAND	Health	Experiment	and	negative	income	tax	experiments,	an	immediate	issue	concerned	the	difference	between	short	and	long-run	responses;	indeed,	differences	between	immediate	and	ultimate	effects	occur	in	a	wide	range	of	RCTs.	Both	health	and	tax	RCTs	aimed	to	discover	what	would	happen	if	consum-ers/workers	were	permanently	faced	with	higher	or	lower	prices/wages,	but	the	tri-als	could	only	run	for	a	limited	period.	A	temporarily	high	tax	rate	on	earnings	is	ef-fectively	a	`fire	sale’	on	leisure,	so	that	the	experiment	provided	an	opportunity	to	take	a	vacation	and	make	up	the	earnings	later,	an	incentive	that	would	be	absent	in	a	permanent	scheme.	How	do	we	get	from	the	short-run	responses	that	come	from	the	trial	to	the	long-run	responses	that	we	want	to	know?	Metcalf	(1973)	and	Ash-enfelter	(1978)	provided	answers	for	the	income	tax	experiments,	as	did	Arrow	(1975)	for	the	Rand	Health	Experiment.			 Arrow’s	analysis	illustrates	how	to	use	both	structure	and	observational	data	to	transport	and	adapt	results	from	one	setting	to	another.	He	models	the	health	ex-periment	as	a	two-period	model	in	which	the	price	of	medical	care	is	lowered	in	the	first	period	only,	and	shows	how	to	derive	what	we	want,	which	is	the	response	in	
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the	first	period	if	prices	were	lowered	by	the	same	proportion	in	both	periods.	The	magnitude	that	we	want	is	S,	the	compensated	price	derivative	of	medical	care	in	period	1	in	the	face	of	identical	increases	in	𝑝"	and	𝑝4	in	both	periods	1	and	2.	This	is	equal	to	𝑠"" + 𝑠"4,	the	sum	of	the	derivatives	of	period	1’s	demand	with	respect	to	the	two	prices.	The	trial	gives	only	𝑠"".	But	if	we	have	post-trial	data	on	medical	ser-vices	for	both	treatments	and	controls,	we	can	infer	𝑠4",	the	effect	of	the	experi-mental	price	manipulation	on	post-experimental	care.	Choice	theory,	in	the	form	of	Slutsky	symmetry	says	that	𝑠"4 = 𝑠4"	and	so	allows	Arrow	to	infer	𝑠"4	and	thus	S.	He	contrasts	this	with	Metcalf’s	alternative	solution,	which	makes	different	assump-tions—that	two	period	preferences	are	intertemporally	additive,	in	which	case	the	long-run	elasticity	can	be	obtained	from	knowledge	of	the	income	elasticity	of	post-experimental	medical	care,	which	would	have	to	come	from	an	observational	analy-sis.	These	two	alternative	approaches	show	how	we	can	choose,	based	on	our	will-ingness	to	make	assumptions	and	on	the	data	that	we	have,	a	suitable	combination	of	(elementary	and	transparent)	theoretical	assumptions	and	observational	data	in	order	to	adapt	and	use	trial	results.	Such	analysis	can	also	help	design	the	original	trial	by	clarifying	what	we	need	to	know	in	order	to	use	the	results	of	a	temporary	treatment	to	estimate	the	permanent	effects	that	we	need.	Ashenfelter	provides	a	third	solution,	noting	that	the	two-period	model	is	formally	identical	to	a	two-person	model,	so	that	we	can	use	information	on	two-person	labor	supply	to	tell	us	about	the	dynamics.		 Theory	can	often	allow	us	to	reclassify	new	or	unknown	situations	as	analo-gous	to	situations	where	we	already	have	background	knowledge.	One	frequently	useful	way	of	doing	this	is	when	the	new	policy	can	be	recast	as	equivalent	to	a	change	in	the	budget	constraint	that	respondents	face.	The	consequences	of	a	new	policy	may	be	easier	to	predict	if	we	can	reduce	it	to	equivalent	changes	in	income	and	prices,	whose	effects	are	often	well	understood	and	well-studied.	Todd	and	Wolpin	(2008)	and	Wolpin	(2013)	make	this	point	and	provide	examples.	In	the	la-bor	supply	case,	an	increase	in	the	tax	rate	has	the	same	effect	as	a	decrease	in	the	wage	rate,	so	that	we	can	rely	on	previous	literature	to	predict	what	will	happen	when	tax	rates	are	changed.	In	the	case	of	Mexico’s	PROGRESA	conditional	cash	
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transfer	program,	Todd	and	Wolpin	note	that	the	subsidies	paid	to	parents	if	their	children	go	to	school	can	be	thought	of	as	a	combination	of	reduction	in	children’s	wages	and	an	increase	in	parents’	income,	which	allows	them	to	predict	the	results	of	the	conditional	cash	experiment	with	limited	additional	assumptions.	If	this	works,	as	it	partially	does	in	their	analysis,	the	trial	helps	consolidate	previous	knowledge	and	contributes	to	an	evolving	body	of	theory	and	empirical,	including	trial,	evidence.		The	program	of	thinking	about	policy	changes	as	equivalent	to	price	and	in-come	changes	has	a	long	history	in	economics;	much	of	rational	choice	theory	can	be	so	interpreted	(see	Deaton	and	Muellbauer	(1980)	for	many	examples).	When	this	conversion	is	credible,	and	when	a	trial	on	some	apparently	unrelated	topic	can	be	modeled	as	equivalent	to	a	change	in	prices	and	incomes,	and	when	we	can	assume	that	people	in	different	settings	respond	relevantly	similarly	to	changes	in	prices	and	incomes,	we	have	a	readymade	framework	for	incorporating	the	trial	results	into	previous	knowledge,	as	well	as	for	extending	the	trial	results	and	using	them	elsewhere.	Of	course,	all	depends	on	the	validity	and	credibility	of	the	theory;	peo-ple	may	not	in	fact	treat	a	tax	increase	as	a	decrease	in	the	price	of	leisure,	and	be-havioral	economics	is	full	of	examples	where	apparently	equivalent	stimuli	generate	non-equivalent	outcomes.	The	embrace	of	behavioral	economics	by	many	of	the	cur-rent	generation	of	trialists	may	account	for	their	limited	willingness	to	use	conven-tional	choice	theory	in	this	way.	Unfortunately,	behavioral	economics	does	not	yet	offer	a	replacement	for	the	general	framework	of	choice	theory	that	is	so	useful	in	this	regard.		 Theory	can	also	help	with	the	problem	we	raised	of	delineating	the	popula-tion	to	which	the	trial	results	immediately	apply	and	for	thinking	about	moving	from	this	population	to	populations	of	interest.	Ashenfelter’s	(1978)	analysis	is	again	a	good	illustration	and	predates	much	similar	work	in	later	literature.	The	in-come	tax	experiments	offered	participation	in	the	trial	to	a	random	sample	of	the	population	of	interest.	Because	there	was	no	blinding	and	no	compulsion,	people	who	were	randomized	into	the	treatment	group	were	free	to	choose	to	refuse	treat-
ment.	As	in	many	subsequent	analyses,	Ashenfelter	supposes	that	people	choose	to	
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participate	if	it	is	in	their	interest	to	do	so,	depending	on	what	has	become	known	in	the	RCT	and	Instrumental	Variables	literature	as	their	own	idiosyncratic	`gain.’	The	simple	labor	supply	model	gives	an	approximate	condition:	If	the	treatment	in-creases	the	tax	rate	from	 t0 	to	 t1 	with	an	offsetting	increase	in	G,	then	an	individual	assigned	to	the	experimental	group	will	decline	to	participate	if			 (t1 − t0 )w0h0 + 12 s00 (t1 − t0 ) >G1 −G0 			 (5)	where	subscript	1	refers	to	the	treatment	situation,	0	to	the	control,	ℎ&	is	hours	worked,	and	𝑠&&	is	the	(negative)	utility-constant	response	of	hours	worked	to	the	tax	rate.	If	there	is	no	substitution,	the	second	term	on	the	left-hand	side	is	zero,	and	people	will	accept	treatment	if	the	increase	in	G	more	than	makes	up	for	the	in-creases	in	taxes	payable,	the	`breakeven’	condition.	In	consequence,	those	with	higher	earnings	are	less	likely	to	accept	treatment.	Some	better-off	people	with	high	substitution	effects	will	also	accept	treatment	if	the	opportunity	to	buy	more	cheap	leisure	is	sufficient	enticement.		 The	selective	acceptance	of	treatment	limits	the	analyst’s	ability	to	learn	about	the	better-off	or	low-substitution	people	who	decline	treatment	but	who	would	have	to	accept	it	if	the	policy	were	implemented.	Both	the	intention-to-treat	estimator	and	the	`as	treated’	estimator	that	compares	the	treated	and	the	un-treated	are	affected,	not	just	by	the	labor	supply	effects	that	the	trial	is	designed	to	induce,	but	by	the	kind	of	selection	effects	that	randomization	is	designed	to	elimi-nate.	Of	course,	the	analysis	that	leads	to	(5)	can	perhaps	help	us	say	something	about	this	and	help	us	adjust	the	trial	estimates	back	to	what	we	would	like	to	know.	Yet	this	is	no	easy	matter	because	selection	depends,	not	only	on	observables,	such	as	pre-experimental	earnings	and	hours	worked,	but	on	(much	harder	to	observe)	labor	supply	responses	that	likely	vary	across	individuals.	Paraphrasing	Ashenfelter,	we	cannot	estimate	the	effects	of	a	permanent	compulsory	negative	income	tax	pro-gram	from	a	transitory	voluntary	trial	without	strong	assumptions	or	additional	evi-dence.		Much	of	the	modern	literature,	for	example	on	training	programs,	wrestles	with	the	issue	of	exactly	who	is	represented	by	the	RCT	results,	including	not	only	
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who	participates	in	the	first	place	but	who	leaves	before	the	trial	is	completed	(see	again	Heckman,	Lalonde	and	Smith	(1999)).	As	in	the	examples	above,	modeling	at-trition	within	a	trial	can	yield	estimates	of	behavioral	responses	that	can	be	used	to	transport	the	findings	to	other	settings	(see	Chan	and	Hamilton	(2006),	Chassang,	Padró	I	Miguel,	and	Snowberg	(2012)	and	Chassang	et	al	(2015)).	When	people	are	allowed	to	reject	their	randomly	assigned	treatment	according	to	their	own	(real	or	perceived)	advantage,	or	to	drop	out	of	a	trial	on	an	estimate	of	the	benefits	and	costs	from	doing	so,	we	have	come	a	long	way	away	from	the	random	allocation	in	the	standard	conception	of	a	randomized	controlled	trial.	Moreover,	the	absence	of	blinding	is	common	in	social	and	economic	RCTs,	and	while	there	are	trials,	such	as	welfare	trials,	that	effectively	compel	people	to	accept	their	assignments,	and	some	where	the	treatment	is	generous	enough	to	do	so,	there	are	trials	where	subjects	have	much	freedom	and,	in	those	cases	it	is	less	than	obvious	to	us	what	role,	if	any,	randomization	plays	in	warranting	the	results.		2.6	Scaling	up:	using	the	average	for	populations	Many	RCTs	are	small-scale	and	local,	for	example	in	a	few	schools,	clinics,	or	farms	in	a	particular	geographic,	cultural,	socio-economic	setting.	If	successful	according	to	a	cost-effectiveness	criterion,	for	example,	it	is	a	candidate	for	scaling-up,	apply-ing	the	same	intervention	for	a	much	larger	area,	often	a	whole	country,	or	some-times	even	beyond,	as	when	some	treatment	is	considered	for	all	relevant	World	Bank	projects.	The	fact	that	the	intervention	might	work	differently	at	scale	has	long	been	noted	in	the	economics	literature,	e.g.	Garfinkel	and	Manski	(1992),	Heckman	(1992),	and	Moffitt	(1992),	and	is	recognized	in	the	recent	review	by	Banerjee	and	Duflo	(2009).	We	want	here	to	emphasize	the	pervasiveness	of	such	effects	as	well	as	to	note	again	that	this	should	not	be	taken	as	an	argument	against	using	RCTs	but	only	against	the	idea	that	effects	at	scale	are	likely	to	be	the	same	as	in	the	trial.			 An	example	of	what	are	often	called	`general	equilibrium	effects’	comes	from	agriculture.	Suppose	an	RCT	demonstrates	that	in	the	study	population	a	new	way	of	using	fertilizer	had	a	substantial	positive	effect	on,	say,	cocoa	yields,	so	that	farmers	who	used	the	new	methods	saw	increases	in	production	and	in	incomes	compared	to	those	in	the	control	group.	If	the	procedure	is	scaled	up	to	the	whole	country,	or	
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to	all	cocoa	farmers	worldwide,	the	price	will	drop,	and	if	the	demand	for	cocoa	is	price	inelastic—as	is	usually	thought	to	be	the	case,	at	least	in	the	short	run—cocoa	farmers’	incomes	will	fall.	Indeed,	the	conventional	wisdom	for	many	crops	is	that	farmers	do	best	when	the	harvest	is	small,	not	large.	Of	course,	these	considerations	might	not	be	decisive	in	deciding	whether	or	not	to	promote	the	innovation,	and	there	may	still	be	long	term	gains	if,	for	example,	some	farmers	find	something	bet-ter	to	do	than	growing	cocoa.	But,	in	this	case,	the	scaled-up	effect	is	opposite	in	sign	to	the	trial	effect.	The	problem	is	not	with	the	trial	results,	which	can	be	usefully	in-corporated	into	a	more	comprehensive	market	model	that	incorporates	the	re-sponses	estimated	by	the	trial.	The	problem	is	only	if	we	assume	that	the	aggregate	looks	like	the	individual.	That	other	ingredients	of	the	aggregate	model	must	come	from	observational	studies	should	not	be	a	criticism,	even	for	those	who	favor	RCTs;	it	is	simply	the	price	of	doing	serious	analysis.			 There	are	many	possible	interventions	that	alter	supply	or	demand	whose	ef-fect,	in	aggregate,	will	change	a	price	or	a	wage	that	is	held	constant	in	the	original	RCT.	Education	will	change	the	supplies	of	skilled	versus	unskilled	labor,	with	impli-cations	for	relative	wage	rates.	Conditional	cash	transfers	increase	the	demand	for	(and	perhaps	supply	of)	schools	and	clinics,	which	will	change	prices	or	waiting	lines,	or	both.	There	are	interactions	between	people	that	will	operate	only	at	scale.	Giving	one	child	a	voucher	to	go	to	private	school	might	improve	her	future,	but	do-ing	so	for	everyone	can	decrease	the	quality	of	education	for	those	children	who	are	left	in	the	public	schools	(see	the	contrasting	studies	of	Angrist	et	al	(2002)	and	Hsieh	and	Urquiola	(2002)).	Educational	or	training	programs	may	benefit	those	who	are	treated	but	harm	those	left	behind;	Crépon	et	al	(2014)	recognize	the	issue	and	show	how	to	adapt	an	RCT	to	deal	with	it.		 Scaling	up	can	also	disturb	the	political	equilibrium.	An	exploitative	govern-ment	may	not	allow	the	mass	transfer	of	money	from	abroad	to	a	powerless	seg-ment	of	the	population,	though	it	may	permit	a	small-scale	RCT	of	cash	transfers,	perhaps	even	in	the	hope	that	a	large-scale	implementation	will	yield	opportunities	for	predation.	Provision	of	healthcare	by	foreign	NGOs	may	be	successful	in	trials,	but	have	unintended	negative	consequences	to	scale	because	of	general	equilibrium	
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effects	on	the	supply	of	healthcare	personnel,	or	because	it	disturbs	the	nature	of	the	contract	between	the	people	and	a	government	that	is	using	tax	revenue	to	pro-vide	services.	In	India,	the	government	spends	large	sums	on	food	subsidies	through	a	system	(the	PDS)	that	is	both	corrupt	and	inefficient,	with	much	of	the	grain	that	is	procured	failing	to	find	its	way	to	the	intended	beneficiaries.	Localized	RCTs	on	whether	or	not	families	are	better	off	with	cash	transfers	are	not	informative	about	how	politicians	would	change	the	amount	of	the	transfer	if	faced	with	unanticipated	inflation,	and	at	least	as	important,	whether	the	government	could	cut	procurement	from	relatively	wealthy	and	politically	powerful	farmers.	Without	a	political	and	general	equilibrium	analysis,	it	is	impossible	to	think	about	the	effects	of	replacing	food	subsidies	with	cash	transfers	(see	e.g.	Basu	(2010)).		Even	in	medicine,	where	biological	interactions	between	people	are	less	com-mon	than	are	social	interactions	in	social	science,	interactions	can	be	important.	In-fectious	diseases	are	one	well-known	example,	where	immunization	programs	af-fect	the	dynamics	of	disease	transmission	through	herd	immunity	(see	Fine	and	Clarkson	(1986)	and	Manski	(2013,	52)).	The	social	and	economic	setting	also	af-fects	how	drugs	are	actually	used	and	the	same	issues	can	arise;	the	distinction	be-tween	efficacy	and	effectiveness	in	clinical	trials	is	in	part	recognition	of	the	fact.		2.7	Drilling	down:	using	the	average	for	individuals	Just	as	there	are	issues	with	scaling-up,	it	is	not	obvious	how	to	use	the	results	from	RCTs	at	the	level	of	individual	units,	even	individual	units	that	were	included	in	the	trial.	A	well-conducted	RCT	delivers	an	ATE	for	the	trial	population	but,	in	general,	that	average	does	not	apply	to	everyone.	It	is	not	true,	for	example,	as	argued	in	the	American	Medical	Association’s	“Users’	guide	to	the	medical	literature”	that	“if	the	patient	would	have	been	enrolled	in	the	study	had	she	been	there—that	is	she	meets	all	of	the	inclusion	criteria	and	doesn’t	violate	any	of	the	exclusion	criteria—there	is	little	question	that	the	results	are	applicable”	(see	Guyatt	et	al	(1994,	60)).	Even	more	misleading	are	the	often-heard	statements	that	an	RCT	with	an	average	treat-ment	effect	insignificantly	different	from	zero	has	shown	that	the	treatment	works	for	no	one.		
	 46	
These	issues	are	familiar	to	physicians	practicing	evidence-based	medicine	whose	guidelines	require	“integrating	individual	clinical	expertise	with	the	best	available	external	clinical	evidence	from	systematic	research,”	Sackett	et	al	(1996,	71).	Exactly	what	this	means	is	unclear;	physicians	know	much	more	about	their	pa-tients	than	is	allowed	for	in	the	ATE	from	the	RCT	(though,	once	again,	stratification	in	the	trial	is	likely	to	be	helpful)	and	they	often	have	intuitive	expertise	from	long	practice	that	can	help	them	identify	features	in	a	particular	patient	that	may	influ-ence	the	effectiveness	of	a	given	treatment	for	that	patient.	But	there	is	an	odd	bal-ance	struck	here.	These	judgments	are	deemed	admissible	in	discussion	with	the	in-dividual	patient,	but	they	don’t	add	up	to	evidence	to	be	made	publicly	available,	with	the	usual	cautions	about	credibility,	by	the	standards	adopted	by	most	EBM	sites.		It	is	also	true	that	physicians	can	have	prejudices	and	`knowledge’	that	might	be	anything	but.	Clearly,	there	are	situations	where	forcing	practitioners	to	follow	the	average	will	do	better,	even	for	individual	patients,	and	others	where	the	oppo-site	is	true,	Kahneman	and	Klein	(2009).			 Whether	or	not	averages	are	useful	to	individuals	raises	the	same	issue	throughout	social	science	research.	Imagine	two	schools,	St	Joseph’s	and	St.	Mary’s,	both	of	which	were	included	in	an	RCT	of	a	classroom	innovation.		The	innovation	is	successful	on	average,	but	should	the	schools	adopt	it?	Should	St	Mary’s	be	influ-enced	by	a	previous	attempt	in	St	Joseph’s	that	was	judged	a	failure?	Many	would	dismiss	this	experience	as	anecdotal	and	ask	how	St	Joseph’s	could	have	known	that	it	was	a	failure	without	benefit	of	`rigorous’	evidence.	Yet	if	St	Mary’s	is	like	St	Jo-seph’s,	with	a	similar	mix	of	pupils,	a	similar	curriculum,	and	similar	academic	standing,	might	not	St	Joseph’s	experience	be	more	relevant	to	what	might	happen	at	St	Mary’s	than	is	the	positive	average	from	the	RCT?	And	might	it	not	be	a	good	idea	for	the	teachers	and	governors	of	St	Mary’s	to	go	to	St	Joseph’s	and	find	out	what	happened	and	why?	They	may	be	able	to	observe	the	mechanism	of	the	failure,	if	such	it	was,	and	figure	out	whether	the	same	problems	would	apply	for	them,	or	whether	they	might	be	able	to	adapt	the	innovation	to	make	it	work	for	them,	per-haps	even	more	successfully	than	the	positive	average	in	the	trial.		
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Once	again,	these	questions	are	unlikely	to	be	easily	answered	in	practice;	but,	as	with	transportability,	there	is	no	serious	alternative	to	trying.	Assuming	that	the	average	works	for	you	will	often	be	wrong,	and	it	will	at	least	sometimes	be	pos-sible	to	do	better.	As	in	the	medical	case,	the	advice	to	individual	schools	often	lacks	specificity.	For	example,	the	U.S.	Institute	of	Education	Sciences	has	provided	a	“user-friendly”	guide	to	practices	supported	by	rigorous	evidence,	US	Department	of	Education	(2003).	The	advice,	which	is	similar	to	recommendations	in	development	economics,	is	that	the	intervention	be	demonstrated	effective	through	well-designed	RCTs	in	more	than	one	site	and	that	“the	trials	should	demonstrate	the	interven-tion’s	effectiveness	in	school	settings	similar	to	yours”	(2003,	17).	No	operational	definition	of	“similar”	is	provided.		2.8	Examples	and	illustrations	from	economics	Our	arguments	in	this	Section	should	not	be	controversial,	yet	we	believe	that	they	represent	an	approach	that	is	different	from	most	current	practice.		To	document	this	and	to	fill	out	the	arguments,	we	provide	some	examples.	While	these	are	occa-sionally	critical,	our	purpose	is	constructive;	indeed,	we	believe	that	misunderstand-ings	about	how	to	use	RCTs	have	artificially	limited	their	usefulness,	as	well	as	alien-ated	some	who	would	otherwise	use	them.		 Conditional	cash	transfers	(CCTs)	are	interventions	that	have	been	tested	us-ing	RCTs	(and	other	RCT-like	methods)	and	are	often	cited	as	a	leading	example	of	how	an	evaluation	with	strong	internal	validity	leads	to	a	rapid	spread	of	the	policy,	e.g.	Angrist	and	Pischke	(2010)	among	many	others.	Think	through	the	causal	chain	that	is	required	for	CCTs	to	be	successful:	People	must	like	money,	they	must	like	(or	do	not	object	too	much)	to	their	children	being	educated	and	vaccinated,	there	must	exist	schools	and	clinics	that	are	close	enough	and	well	enough	staffed	to	do	their	job,	and	the	government	or	agency	that	is	running	the	scheme	must	care	about	the	wellbeing	of	families	and	their	children.	That	such	conditions	hold	in	a	wide	range	of	(although	certainly	not	all)	countries	makes	it	unsurprising	that	CCTs	`work’	in	many	replications,	though	they	certainly	will	not	work	in	places	where	the	schools	and	clinics	do	not	exist,	e.g.	Levy	(2001),	nor	in	places	where	people	strongly	oppose	education	or	vaccination.		
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Similarly,	given	that	the	support	factors	will	operate	with	different	strengths	and	effectiveness	in	different	places,	it	is	also	not	surprising	that	the	size	of	the	ATE	differs	from	place	to	place;	for	example,	Vivalt’s	AidGrade	website	lists	29	estimates	from	a	range	of	countries	of	the	standardized	(divided	by	local	standard	deviation	of	the	outcome)	effects	of	CCTs	on	school	attendance;	all	but	four	show	the	expected	positive	effect,	and	the	range	runs	from	–8	to	+38	percentage	points,	Vivalt	(2015).	Even	in	this	leading	case,	where	we	might	reasonably	conclude	that	CCTs	`work’	in	getting	children	into	school,	it	would	be	hard	to	calculate	credible	cost-effectiveness	numbers	or	to	come	to	a	general	conclusion	about	whether	CCTs	are	more	or	less	cost	effective	than	other	possible	policies.	Both	costs	and	effect	sizes	can	be	ex-pected	to	differ	in	new	settings,	just	as	they	have	in	observed	ones,	making	these	predictions	difficult.		 The	range	of	estimates	illustrates	that	the	simple	view	of	external	validity—that	the	ATE	transports	from	one	place	to	another—is	not	reasonable.	AidGrade	uses	standardized	measures	of	effect	size	divided	by	standard	deviation	of	outcome	at	baseline,	as	does	the	major	multi-country	study	by	Banerjee	et	al	(2015).	But	we	might	prefer	measures	that	have	an	economic	interpretation,	such	as	additional	months	of	schooling	per	$100	spent	(for	example	if	a	donor	is	trying	to	decide	where	to	spend,	see	below).	Nutrition	might	be	measured	by	height,	or	by	the	log	of	height.	Even	if	the	ATE	by	one	measure	carries	across,	it	will	only	do	so	using	an-other	measure	if	the	relationship	between	the	two	measures	is	the	same	in	both	sit-uations.	This	is	exactly	the	sort	of	thing	that	a	formal	analysis	of	transportability	forces	us	to	think	about.		(Note	also	that	the	ATE	in	the	original	RCT	can	differ	de-pending	on	whether	the	outcome	is	measured	in	levels	or	in	logs;	it	is	easy	to	con-struct	examples	where	the	two	ATEs	have	different	signs.)	Much	of	the	economics	literature,	like	the	medical	literature,	works	with	the	view	of	external	validity	that,	unless	there	is	evidence	to	the	contrary,	the	direction	and	size	of	treatment	effects	can	be	transported	from	one	place	to	another.	The	J-PAL	website	reports	its	findings	under	a	general	heading	of	policy	relevance,	subdi-vided	by	a	selection	of	topics.	Under	each	topic,	there	is	a	list	of	relevant	RCTs	from	a	range	of	different	settings	around	the	world.	These	are	conveniently	converted	
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into	a	common	cost-effectiveness	measure	so	that,	for	example,	under	“education”,	subhead	“student	participation”,	there	are	four	studies	from	Africa:	on	informing	parents	about	the	returns	to	education	in	Madagascar,	on	deworming,	on	school	uni-forms,	and	on	merit	scholarships,	all	from	Kenya.	The	units	of	measurement	are	ad-ditional	years	of	student	education	per	$100,	and	among	these	four	studies,	the	av-erage	effects	of	spending	$100	are	20.7	years,	13.9	years,	0.71	years	and	0.27	years	respectively.	(Note	that	this	is	a	different—and	much	superior—standardization	from	the	effect	size	standardization	discussed	below.)	What	can	we	conclude	from	such	comparisons?	For	a	philanthropic	donor	in-terested	in	education,	and	if	marginal	and	average	effects	are	the	same,	they	might	indicate	that	the	best	place	to	devote	a	marginal	dollar	is	in	Madagascar,	where	it	would	be	used	to	inform	parents	about	the	value	of	education.	This	is	certainly	use-ful,	but	it	is	not	as	useful	as	statements	that	information	or	deworming	programs	are	everywhere	more	cost-effective	than	programs	involving	school	uniforms	or	scholarships,	or	if	not	everywhere,	at	least	over	some	domain,	and	it	is	these	second	kinds	of	comparison	that	would	genuinely	fulfill	the	promise	of	`finding	out	what	works.’		But	such	comparisons	only	make	sense	if	we	can	transport	the	results	from	one	place	to	another,	if	the	Kenyan	results	also	hold	in	Madagascar,	Mali,	or	Na-mibia,	or	some	other	list	of	places.	J-PAL’s	manual	for	cost-effectiveness,	Dhaliwal	et	al	(2012)	explains	in	(entirely	appropriate)	detail	how	to	handle	variation	in	costs	across	sites,	noting	variable	factors	such	as	population	density,	prices,	exchange	rates,	discount	rates,	inflation,	and	bulk	discounts.	But	it	gives	short	shrift	to	cross-site	variation	in	the	size	of	ATEs,	which	play	an	equal	part	in	the	calculations	of	cost	effectiveness.	The	manual	briefly	notes	that	diminishing	returns	(or	the	last-mile	problem)	might	be	important	in	theory	but	argues	that	the	baseline	levels	of	out-comes	are	likely	to	be	similar	in	the	pilot	and	replication	areas,	so	that	the	ATE	can	be	safely	transported	as	is.	All	of	this	lacks	a	justification	for	transportability,	some	understanding	of	when	results	transport,	when	they	do	not,	or	better	still,	how	they	should	be	modified	to	make	them	transportable.		
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One	of	the	largest	and	most	technically	impressive	of	the	development	RCTs	is	by	Banerjee	et	al	(2015),	which	tests	a	“graduation”	program	designed	to	perma-nently	lift	extremely	poor	people	from	poverty	by	providing	them	with	a	gift	of	a	productive	asset	(from	guinea-pigs,	(regular-)	pigs,	sheep,	goats,	or	chickens	de-pending	on	locale),	training	and	support,	and	life-skills	coaching,	as	well	as	support	for	consumption,	saving,	and	health	services.	The	idea	is	that	this	package	of	aid	can	help	people	break	out	of	poverty	traps	in	a	way	that	would	not	be	possible	with	one	intervention	at	a	time.	Comparable	versions	of	the	program	were	tested	in	Ethiopia,	Ghana,	Honduras,	India,	Pakistan,	and	Peru	and,	excepting	Honduras	(where	the	chickens	died)	find	largely	positive	and	persistent	effects—with	similar	(standard-ized)	effect	sizes—for	a	range	of	outcomes	(economic,	mental	and	physical	health,	and	female	empowerment).	One	site	apart,	essentially	everyone	accepted	their	as-signment.	Replication	of	positive	ATEs	over	such	a	wide	range	of	places	certainly	provides	proof	of	concept	for	such	a	scheme.	Yet	Bauchet,	Morduch,	and	Ravi	(2015)	fail	to	replicate	the	result	in	South	India,	where	the	control	group	got	access	to	much	the	same	benefits,	what	Heckman,	Hohman,	and	Smith	(2000)	call	“substitution	bias”.	Even	so,	the	results	are	important	because,	although	there	is	a	longstanding	interest	in	poverty	traps,	many	economists	have	been	skeptical	of	their	existence	or	that	they	could	be	sprung	by	such	aid-based	policies.	In	this	sense,	the	study	is	an	important	contribution	to	the	theory	of	economic	development;	it	tests	a	theoretical	proposition	and	will	(or	should)	change	minds	about	it.	A	number	of	difficulties	remain.	As	the	authors	note,	such	trials	cannot	tell	us	which	component	of	the	treatment	accounted	for	the	results,	or	which	might	be	dis-pensable—a	much	more	expensive	multifactorial	trial	would	be	required—though	it	seems	likely	in	practice	that	the	costliest	component—the	repeated	visits	for	train-ing	and	support—is	likely	to	be	the	first	to	be	cut	by	cash-strapped	politicians	or	ad-ministrators.	And	as	noted,	it	is	not	clear	what	should	count	as	(simple)	replication	in	international	comparisons;	it	is	hard	to	think	of	the	uses	of	standardized	effect	sizes,	except	to	document	that	effects	exist	everywhere	and	that	they	are	similarly	large	relative	to	local	variation	in	such	things.			
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The	effect	size—the	ATE	standardized	by	being	expressed	in	numbers	of	standard	deviations	of	the	original	outcome—though	conveniently	dimensionless,	has	little	to	recommend	it.	As	with	much	of	RCT	practice,	it	strips	out	any	economic	content—no	rates	of	return,	or	benefits	minus	costs—and	it	removes	any	discipline	on	what	is	being	compared.	Apples	and	oranges	become	immediately	comparable,	as	do	treatments	whose	inclusion	in	a	meta-analysis	is	limited	only	by	the	imagina-tion	of	the	analysts	in	claiming	similarity.	Training	programs	for	physical	fitness	can	be	pooled	with	training	programs	for	welding,	or	marketing,	or	even	obedience	training	for	pets.	In	psychology,	where	the	concept	originated,	this	results	in	endless	disputes	about	what	should	and	should	not	be	pooled	in	a	meta-analysis.	Goldberger	and	Manski	(1995,	769)	note	that	“standardization	accomplishes	nothing	except	to	give	quantities	in	noncomparable	units	the	superficial	appearance	of	being	in	com-parable	units.	This	accomplishment	is	worse	than	useless—it	yields	misleading	in-ferences.”	Beyond	that,	Simpson	(2017)	notes	that	restrictions	on	the	trial	sample—often	good	practice	to	reduce	background	noise	and	to	help	detect	an	effect—will	reduce	the	baseline	standard	deviation	and	inflate	the	effect	size.	More	generally,	ef-fect	sizes	are	open	to	manipulation	by	exclusion	rules.	It	makes	no	sense	to	claim	replicability	on	the	basis	of	effect	sizes,	let	alone	to	use	them	to	rank	projects.	Effect	sizes	are	irrelevant	for	policymaking.		The	graduation	study	can	be	taken	as	the	closest	to	fulfilling	the	`finding	out	what	works’	aim	of	the	RCT	movement	in	development.	Yet	it	is	silent	on	perhaps	the	crucial	aspect	for	policy,	which	is	that	the	trial	was	run	in	partnership	with	NGOs,	whereas	what	we	would	like	to	know	is	whether	it	could	be	replicated	by	gov-ernments,	including	those	governments	that	are	incapable	of	getting	doctors,	nurses,	and	teachers	to	show	up	to	clinics	or	schools,	Chaudhury	et	al	(2005),	Banerjee,	Deaton	and	Duflo	(2004),	or	of	regulating	the	quality	of	medical	care	in	ei-ther	the	public	or	private	sectors,	Filmer,	Hammer	and	Pritchett	(2000)	or	Das	and	Hammer	(2005).	In	fact,	we	already	know	a	great	deal	about	`what	works.’	Vaccina-tions	work,	maternal	and	child	healthcare	services	work,	and	classroom	teaching	works.	Yet	knowing	this	does	not	get	those	things	done.	Adding	another	program	that	works	under	ideal	conditions	is	useful	only	where	conditions	are	in	fact	ideal,	in	
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which	case	it	would	likely	be	unnecessary.	Finding	out	what	works	is	not	the	magic	key	to	economic	development.	Technical	knowledge,	though	always	worth	having,	requires	suitable	institutions	and	suitable	incentives	if	it	is	to	do	any	good.			A	similar	point	is	documented	in	the	contrast	between	a	successful	trial	that	used	cameras	and	threats	of	wage	reductions	to	incentivize	attendance	of	teachers	in	schools	run	by	an	NGO	in	Rajasthan	in	India,	Duflo,	Hanna,	and	Ryan	(2012),	and	the	subsequent	failure	of	a	follow-up	program	in	the	same	state	to	tackle	mass	ab-senteeism	of	health	workers,	Banerjee,	Duflo,	and	Glennerster	(2008).	In	the	schools,	the	cameras	and	timekeeping	worked	as	intended,	and	teacher	attendance	increased.	In	the	clinics,	there	was	a	short-run	effect	on	nurse	attendance,	but	it	was	quickly	eliminated.	(The	ability	of	agents	eventually	to	undermine	policies	that	are	initially	effective	is	common	enough	and	not	easily	handled	within	an	RCT.)	In	both	trials,	there	were	incentives	to	improve	attendance,	and	there	were	incentives	to	find	a	way	to	sabotage	the	monitoring	and	restore	workers	to	their	accustomed	po-sitions;	the	force	of	these	incentives	is	a	`high-level’	cause,	like	gravity,	or	the	princi-ple	of	the	lever,	that	works	in	much	the	same	way	everywhere.	For	the	clinics,	some	sabotage	was	direct—the	smashing	of	cameras—and	some	was	subtler,	when	gov-ernment	supervisors	provided	official,	though	specious,	reasons	for	missing	work.	We	can	only	conjecture	why	the	causality	was	switched	in	the	move	from	NGO	to	government;	we	suspect	that	working	for	a	highly-respected	local	NGO	is	a	different	contract	from	working	for	the	government,	where	not	showing	up	for	work	is	widely	(if	informally)	understood	to	be	part	of	the	deal.	The	incentive	lever	works	when	it	is	wired	up	right,	as	with	the	NGOs,	but	not	when	the	wiring	cuts	it	out,	as	with	the	government.	Knowing	`what	works’	in	the	sense	of	the	treatment	effect	on	the	trial	population	is	of	limited	value	without	understanding	the	political	and	insti-tutional	environment	in	which	it	is	set.	This	underlines	the	need	to	understand	the	underlying	social,	economic,	and	cultural	structures—including	the	incentives	and	agency	problems	that	inhibit	service	delivery—that	are	required	to	support	the	causal	pathways	that	we	should	like	to	see	at	work.	Trials	in	economic	development	often	take	place	in	artificial	environments.	Drèze	(2016)	notes,	based	on	extensive	experience	in	India,	“when	a	foreign	agency	
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comes	in	with	its	heavy	boots	and	suitcases	of	dollars	to	administer	a	`treatment,’	whether	through	a	local	NGO	or	government	or	whatever,	there	is	a	lot	going	on	other	than	the	treatment.”	There	is	also	the	suspicion	that	a	treatment	that	works	does	so	because	of	the	presence	of	the	`treators,’	often	from	abroad,	and	may	not	work	do	so	with	the	people	who	will	work	it	in	practice.			 There	is	also	much	to	be	learned	from	many	years	of	economic	trials	in	the	United	States,	particularly	from	the	work	of	MDRC,	from	the	early	income	tax	trials,	as	well	as	from	the	Rand	Health	Experiment.	Following	the	income	tax	trials,	MDRC	has	run	many	randomized	trials	since	the	1970s,	mostly	for	the	Federal	government	but	also	for	individual	states	and	for	Canada	(see	the	thorough	and	informative	ac-count	by	Gueron	and	Rolston	(2011)	for	the	factual	information	underlying	the	fol-lowing	discussion).	MDRC’s	program,	like	that	of	JPAL	in	development,	is	intended	to	find	out	`what	works’	in	the	state	and	federal	welfare	programs.	These	programs	are	conditional	cash	transfers	in	which	poor	recipients	are	given	cash	provided	they	satisfy	certain	conditions	such	as	work	requirements	or	training,	which	are	often	the	subject	of	the	trial.	What	are	the	benefits	and	costs	of	various	alternatives,	both	to	the	recipients	and	to	the	local	and	federal	taxpayers?	All	of	these	programs	are	deeply	politicized,	with	sharply	different	views	over	both	facts	and	desirability.	Many	engaged	in	these	disputes	feel	certain	of	what	should	be	done	and	what	its	consequences	will	be	so	that,	by	their	lights,	control	groups	are	unethical	because	they	deprive	some	people	of	what	the	advocates	`know’	will	be	certain	benefits.	Given	this,	it	is	perhaps	surprising	that	RCTs	have	become	the	accepted	norm	for	this	kind	of	policy	evaluation	in	the	US.		 The	reasons	owe	much	to	political	institutions,	as	well	as	to	the	common	be-lief,	explored	in	Section	1,	that	RCTs	can	reveal	the	truth.	At	the	Federal	level,	pro-spective	policies	are	vetted	by	the	non-partisan	Congressional	Budget	Office	(CBO),	which	makes	its	own	estimates	of	the	budgetary	implications	of	the	program.	Ideo-logues	whose	programs	are	scored	poorly	by	the	CBO	have	an	incentive	to	support	an	RCT,	not	to	convince	themselves,	but	to	convince	opponents;	once	again,	RCTs	are	valuable	when	your	opponents	do	not	share	your	prior.	And	control	groups	are	
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easier	to	put	in	place	when	there	are	insufficient	funds	to	cover	the	whole	popula-tion.	There	was	also	a	widespread	and	largely	uncritical	belief	that	RCTs	give	the	right	answer,	at	least	for	the	budgetary	implications,	which,	rather	than	the	wellbe-ing	of	the	recipients,	were	often	the	primary	concern;	note	that	all	of	these	trials	are	on	poor	people	by	rich	people	who	are	typically	more	concerned	with	cost	than	with	the	wellbeing	of	the	poor,	Greenberg,	Schroder	and	Onstott	(1999).	MDRCs	trials	could	therefore	be	effective	dispute-reconciliation	mechanisms	both	for	those	who	saw	the	need	for	evidence	and	for	those	who	did	not	(except	instrumentally).	The	outcome	here	fits	with	our	`public	health’	case;	what	the	politicians	need	to	know	is	not	the	outcomes	for	individuals,	or	even	how	the	outcomes	in	one	state	might	transport	to	another,	but	the	average	budgetary	cost	in	a	specific	place,	something	that	a	good	RCT	conducted	on	a	representative	sample	of	the	target	population	can	deliver,	at	least	in	the	absence	of	general	equilibrium	effects,	timing	effects,	etc.		 These	RCTs	by	MDRC	and	other	contractors	have	demonstrated	both	the	fea-sibility	of	large-scale	social	trials	including	the	possibility	of	randomization	in	these	settings	(where	many	participants	were	hostile	to	the	idea),	as	well	as	their	useful-ness	to	policymakers.	They	also	seem	to	have	changed	beliefs,	for	example	in	favor	of	the	desirability	of	work	requirements	as	a	condition	of	welfare,	even	among	many	originally	opposed.	There	are	also	limitations;	the	trials	appear	to	have	had	at	best	a	minor	influence	on	scientific	thinking	about	behavior	in	labor	markets	and,	in	that	sense,	they	are	more	about	`plumbing’	than	science,	Duflo	(2017).	The	results	of	similar	programs	have	often	been	different	across	different	sites,	and	there	has	to	date	been	no	firm	understanding	of	why;	indeed,	the	trials	are	not	designed	to	re-veal	this,	Moffitt	(2004).	Finally,	and	perhaps	crucially	for	the	potential	contribution	to	economic	science,	there	has	been	little	success	in	understanding	either	the	under-lying	structures	or	chains	of	causation,	in	spite	of	a	determined	effort	from	the	be-ginning	to	open	the	black	boxes.			 The	RAND	health	experiment,	Manning	et	al	(1975a,	b),	provides	a	different	but	equally	instructive	story	if	only	because	its	results	have	permeated	the	academic	and	policy	discussions	about	healthcare	ever	since.	It	was	originally	designed	to	test	whether	more	generous	insurance	causes	people	to	use	more	medical	care	and,	if	so,	
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by	how	much.	The	incentive	effects	are	hardly	in	doubt	today;	the	immortality	of	the	study	comes	rather	from	the	fact	that	its	multi-arm	(response	surface)	design	al-lowed	the	calculation	of	an	elasticity	for	the	study	population,	that	medical	expendi-tures	decreased	by	–0.1	to	–0.2	percent	for	every	percentage	increase	in	the	copay-ment.	According	to	Aron-Dine,	Einav,	and	Finkelstein	(2013),	it	is	this	dimensionless	and	thus	apparently	transportable	number	that	has	been	used	ever	since	to	discuss	the	design	of	healthcare	policy;	the	elasticity	has	come	to	be	treated	as	a	universal	constant.	Ironically,	they	argue	that	the	estimate	cannot	be	replicated	in	recent	stud-ies,	and	it	is	even	unclear	that	it	is	firmly	based	on	the	original	evidence.	This	points,	once	again,	to	the	central	importance	of	transportability	for	the	usefulness,	both	short	and	long	term,	of	a	trial.	Here,	the	simple	direct	transportability	of	the	result	seems	to	have	been	largely	illusory	though,	as	we	have	argued,	this	does	not	mean	that	more	complex	constructions	based	on	the	results	of	the	trial	would	not	have	done	better.		
Conclusions		It	is	useful	to	respond	to	two	challenges	that	are	often	put	to	us,	one	from	medicine	and	one	from	social	science.	The	medical	challenge	is,	“If	you	are	being	prescribed	a	new	drug,	wouldn’t	you	want	it	to	have	been	through	an	RCT?”	The	second	(related)	challenge	is,	“OK,	you	have	highlighted	some	of	the	problems	with	RCTs,	but	other	methods	have	all	of	those	problems,	plus	problems	of	their	own.”	We	believe	that	we	have	answered	both	of	these	in	the	paper	but	that	it	is	helpful	to	recapitulate.			 The	medical	challenge	is	about	you,	a	specific	person,	so	that	one	answer	would	be	that	you	may	be	different	from	the	average,	and	you	are	entitled	to	and	ought	to	ask	about	theory	and	evidence	about	whether	it	will	work	for	you.	This	would	be	in	the	form	of	a	conversation	between	you	and	your	physician,	who	knows	a	lot	about	you.	You	would	want	to	know	how	this	class	of	drug	is	supposed	to	work	and	whether	that	mechanism	is	likely	to	work	for	you.	Is	there	any	evidence	from	other	patients,	especially	patients	like	you,	with	your	condition	and	in	your	circum-stances,	or	are	there	suggestions	from	theory?	What	scientific	work	has	been	done	to	identify	what	support	factors	matter	for	success	with	this	kind	of	drug?	If	the	only	
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information	available	is	from	the	pharmaceutical	company,	an	RCT	might	seem	like	a	good	idea.	But	even	then,	and	although	knowledge	of	the	mean	effect	among	some	group	is	certainly	of	value,	you	might	give	little	weight	to	an	RCT	whose	participants	are	selected	in	the	way	they	were	selected	in	the	trial,	or	where	there	is	little	infor-mation	about	whether	the	outcomes	are	relevant	to	you.	Recall	that	many	new	drugs	are	prescribed	‘off-label’,	for	a	purpose	for	which	they	were	not	tested,	and	beyond	that,	that	many	new	drugs	are	administered	in	the	absence	of	an	RCT	because	you	are	actually	being	enrolled	in	one.	For	patients	whose	last	chance	is	to	participate	in	a	trial	of	some	new	drug,	this	is	exactly	the	sort	of	conversation	you	should	have	with	your	physician	(followed	by	one	asking	her	to	reveal	whether	you	are	in	the	ac-tive	arm,	so	that	you	can	switch	if	not),	and	such	conversations	need	to	take	place	for	all	prescriptions	that	are	new	to	you.	In	these	conversations,	the	results	of	an	RCT	may	have	marginal	value.	If	your	physician	tells	you	that	she	endorses	evidence-based	medicine,	and	that	the	drug	will	most	likely	work	for	you	because	an	RCT	has	shown	that	‘it	works’,	it	is	time	to	find	a	new	physician.		 The	second	challenge	claims	that	other	methods	are	always	dominated	by	an	RCT.	This	kind	of	challenge	is	not	well-formulated.	Dominated	for	answering	what	question,	for	what	purposes?	The	chief	advantage	of	the	RCT	is	that	it	can,	if	well-conducted,	give	an	unbiased	estimate	of	an	ATE	in	a	study	(trial)	sample	and	thus	provide	evidence	that	the	treatment	caused	the	outcome	in	some	individuals	in	that	sample.	If	that	is	what	you	want	to	know	and	there’s	little	background	knowledge	available	and	the	price	is	right,	then	an	RCT	may	be	the	best	choice.		As	to	other	questions,	the	RCT	result	can	be	part—but	usually	only	a	small	part—of	the	defense	of	(a)	a	general	claim,	(b)	a	claim	that	the	treatment	will	cause	that	outcome	for	some	other	individuals,	or	even	(c)	a	claim	about	what	the	ATE	will	be	in	some	other	population.	But	they	do	little	for	these	enterprises	on	their	own.	What	is	the	best	overall	package	of	research	work	for	tackling	these	questions—most	cost-effective	and	most	likely	to	produce	correct	results—depends	on	what	we	know	and	what	different	kinds	of	research	will	cost.	
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	 There	are	examples	where	an	RCT	does	better	than	an	observational	study,	and	these	seem	to	be	the	cases	that	come	to	mind	for	defenders	of	RCTs.	For	exam-ple,	regressions	of	whether	people	who	get	Medicaid	do	better	or	worse	than	people	with	private	insurance	are	vitiated	by	gross	differences	in	the	other	characteristics	of	the	two	populations.	But	it	is	a	long	step	from	that	to	saying	that	an	RCT	can	solve	the	problem,	let	alone	that	it	is	the	only	way	to	solve	the	problem.	It	will	not	only	be	expensive	per	subject,	but	it	can	only	enroll	a	selected	and	almost	certainly	unrepre-sentative	study	sample,	it	can	be	run	only	temporarily,	and	the	recruitment	to	the	experiment	will	necessarily	be	different	from	recruitment	in	a	scheme	that	is	per-manent	and	open	to	the	full	qualified	population.	None	of	this	removes	the	blem-ishes	of	the	observational	study,	but	there	are	many	methods	of	mitigating	its	diffi-culties,	so	that,	in	the	end,	an	observational	study	with	credible	corrections	and	a	more	relevant	and	much	larger	study	sample—today	often	the	complete	population	of	interest	through	administrative	records—may	provide	a	better	estimate.	Every-thing	has	to	be	judged	on	a	case	-by-case	basis.		There	is	no	rigorous	argument	for	a	lexicographic	preference	for	RCTs.			 There	is	also	an	important	line	of	enquiry	that	goes,	not	only	beyond	RCTs,	but	beyond	the	‘method	of	differences’	that	is	common	to	RCTs,	regressions,	or	any	form	of	controlled	or	uncontrolled	comparison.	The	hypothetico-deductive	method	confronts	theory-based	deductions	with	the	data—either	observational	or	experi-mental.	As	noted	above,	economists	routinely	use	theory	to	tease	out	a	new	implica-tion	that	can	be	taken	to	the	data,	and	there	are	also	good	examples	in	medicine	such	as	Bleyer	and	Welch	(2012)’s	demonstration	of	the	limited	impact	on	breast	cancer	incidence	of	mammography	screening,	a	topic	where	other	methods	have	generated	great	controversy	and	little	consensus.		RCTs	are	the	ultimate	in	non-parametric	estimation	of	average	treatment	ef-fects	in	the	trial	samples	because	they	make	so	few	assumptions	about	heterogene-ity,	causal	structure,	choice	of	variables,	and	functional	form.	RCTs	are	often	conven-ient	ways	to	introduce	experimenter-controlled	variance—if	you	want	to	see	what	happens,	then	kick	it	and	see,	twist	the	lion’s	tail—but	note	that	many	experiments,	including	many	of	the	most	important	(and	Nobel	Prize	winning)	experiments	in	
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economics,	do	not	and	did	not	use	randomization,	Harrison	(2013),	Svorencik	(2015).	But	the	credibility	of	the	results,	even	internally,	can	be	undermined	by	un-balanced	covariates	and	by	excessive	heterogeneity	in	responses,	especially	when	the	distribution	of	effects	is	asymmetric,	where	inference	on	means	can	be	hazard-ous.	Ironically,	the	price	of	the	credibility	in	RCTs	is	that	we	can	only	recover	the	mean	of	the	distribution	of	treatment	effects,	and	that	only	for	the	trial	sample.	Yet,	in	the	presence	of	outliers,	reliable	inference	on	means	is	difficult.	And	randomiza-tion	in	and	of	itself	does	nothing	unless	the	details	are	right;	purposive	selection	into	the	experimental	population,	like	purposive	selection	into	and	out	of	assignment,	undermines	inference	in	just	the	same	way	as	does	selection	in	observational	stud-ies.	Lack	of	blinding,	whether	of	participants,	trialists,	data	collectors,	or	analysts,	undermines	inference,	akin	to	a	failure	of	exclusion	restrictions	in	instrumental	vari-able	analysis.		The	lack	of	structure	can	be	seriously	disabling	when	we	try	to	use	RCT	re-sults	outside	of	a	few	contexts,	such	as	program	evaluation,	hypothesis	testing,	or	establishing	proof	of	concept.	Beyond	that,	the	results	cannot	be	used	to	help	make	predictions	beyond	the	trial	sample	without	more	structure,	without	more	prior	in-formation,	and	without	having	some	idea	of	what	makes	treatment	effects	vary	from	place	to	place	or	time	to	time.	There	is	no	option	but	to	commit	to	some	causal	structure	if	we	are	to	know	how	to	use	RCT	evidence	out	of	the	original	context.	Simple	generalization	and	simple	extrapolation	do	not	cut	the	mustard.	This	is	true	of	any	study,	experimental	or	observational.	But	observational	studies	are	familiar	with,	and	routinely	work	with,	the	sort	of	assumptions	that	RCTs	claim	to	avoid,	so	that	if	the	aim	is	to	use	empirical	evidence,	any	credibility	advantage	that	RCTs	have	in	estimation	is	no	longer	operative.	And	because	RCTs	tell	us	so	little	about	why	re-sults	happen,	they	have	a	disadvantage	over	studies	that	use	a	wider	range	of	prior	information	and	data	to	help	nail	down	mechanisms.		Yet	once	that	commitment	has	been	made,	RCT	evidence	can	be	extremely	useful,	pinning	down	part	of	a	structure,	helping	to	build	stronger	understanding	and	knowledge,	and	helping	to	assess	welfare	consequences.	As	our	examples	show,	this	can	often	be	done	without	committing	to	the	full	complexity	of	what	are	often	
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thought	of	as	structural	models.	Yet	without	the	structure	that	allows	us	to	place	RCT	results	in	context,	or	to	understand	the	mechanisms	behind	those	results,	not	only	can	we	not	transport	whether	`it	works’	elsewhere,	but	we	cannot	do	the	stand-ard	stuff	of	economics,	which	is	to	say	whether	the	intervention	is	actually	welfare	improving.	Without	knowing	why	things	happen	and	why	people	do	things,	we	run	the	risk	of	worthless	casual	(`fairy	story’)	causal	theorizing	and	have	given	up	on	one	of	the	central	tasks	of	economics.		We	must	back	away	from	the	refusal	to	theorize,	from	the	exultation	in	our	ability	to	handle	unlimited	heterogeneity,	and	actually	SAY	something.	Perhaps	par-adoxically,	unless	we	are	prepared	to	make	assumptions,	and	to	say	what	we	know,	making	statements	that	will	be	incredible	to	some,	all	the	credibility	of	the	RCT	is	for	naught.	RCTs	in	economics	on	health,	labor,	and	development	have	proven	their	worth	in	providing	proofs	of	concept	and	at	testing	predictions	that	some	policies	must	always	work	or	can	never	work.	But,	as	elsewhere	in	economics,	we	cannot	find	out	why	something	works	by	simply	demonstrating	that	it	does	work,	no	matter	how	often,	which	leaves	us	uninformed	as	to	whether	the	policy	should	be	imple-mented.	Beyond	that,	small	scale,	demonstration	RCTs	are	not	capable	of	telling	us	what	would	happen	if	these	policies	were	implemented	to	scale,	of	capturing	unin-tended	consequences	that	typically	cannot	be	included	in	the	protocols,	or	of	model-ing	what	will	happen	if	schemes	are	implemented	differently	than	in	the	trial,	for	ex-ample	by	governments,	whose	motives	and	operating	principles	are	different	from	the	NGOs	or	academics	who	typically	run	trials.	While	it	is	true	that	abstract	knowledge	is	always	likely	to	be	beneficial,	successful	policy	depends	on	institutions	and	on	politics,	matters	on	which	RCTs	have	little	to	say.	The	results	of	RCTs	can	and	should	feed	into	public	debate	about	what	should	be	done,	but	we	are	on	dangerous	ground	when	they	are	used,	on	grounds	of	their	supposed	epistemic	superiority,	to	insulate	policy	from	democratic	processes.			
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Appendix:	Monte	Carlo	experiment	for	an	RCT	with	outliers	In	this	illustrative	example,	there	is	parent	population	each	member	of	which	has	his	or	her	own	treatment	effect;	these	are	continuously	distributed	with	a	shifted	lognormal	distribu-tion	with	zero	mean	so	that	the	population	ATE	is	zero.	The	individual	treatment	effects	β 	are	distributed	so	that	 β + e0.5 ∼ Λ(0,1) ,	for	standardized	lognormal	distribution	Λ. 	In	the	absence	of	treatment,	everyone	in	the	sample	records	zero,	so	the	sample	average	treat-ment	effect	in	any	one	trial	is	simply	the	mean	outcome	among	the	n	treatments.	For	values	of	n	equal	to	25,	50,	100,	200,	and	500	we	draw	from	the	parent	population	100	trial	sam-ples	each	of	size	2n;	with	five	values	of	n,	this	gives	us	500	trial	samples	in	all;	because	of	sampling	the	true	ATE’s	in	each	trial	sample	will	not	be	zero.	For	each	of	these	500	samples,	we	randomize	into	n	controls	and	n	treatments,	estimate	the	ATE	and	its	estimated	t–value	(using	the	standard	two-sample	t–value,	or	equivalently,	by	running	a	regression	with	ro-bust	t–values),	and	then	repeat	1,000	times,	so	we	have	1,000	ATE	estimates	and	t–values	for	each	of	the	500	trial	samples.	These	allow	us	to	assess	the	distribution	of	ATE	estimates	and	their	nominal	t–values	for	each	trial.		The	results	are	shown	in	Table	A1.	Each	row	corresponds	to	a	sample	size.	In	each	row,	we	show	the	results	of	100,000	individual	trials,	composed	of	1,000	replications	on	each	of	the	100	trial	(experimental)	samples.	The	columns	are	averaged	over	all	100,000	tri-als.			 	
Table	A1:	RCTs	with	skewed	treatment	effects	Sample	size	 Mean	of	ATE	estimates	 Mean	of	nominal	t–values	 Fraction	null	re-jected	(percent)	25	50	 0.0268	0.0266	 –0.4274	–0.2952	 13.54	11.20	100	 –0.0018	 –0.2600	 8.71	200	 0.0184	 –0.1748	 7.09	500	 –0.0024	 –0.1362	 6.06	Note:	1,000	randomizations	on	each	of	100	draws	of	the	trial	sample	randomly	drawn	from	a	lognormal	distribution	of	treatment	effects	shifted	to	have	a	zero	mean.	
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The	last	column	shows	the	fractions	of	times	the	null	that	is	true	in	the	population	is	rejected	in	the	trial	samples	and	is	our	key	result.	When	there	are	only	50	treatments	and	50	controls	(row	2),	the	(true)	null	is	rejected	11.2	percent	of	the	time,	instead	of	the	5	per-cent	that	we	would	like	and	expect	if	we	were	unaware	of	the	problem.	When	there	are	500	units	in	each	arm,	the	rejection	rate	is	6.06	percent,	much	closer	to	the	nominal	5	percent.		
	
Figure	A1:	Estimates	of	an	ATE	with	an	outlier	in	the	trial	sample	Figure	A1	illustrates	the	estimated	ATEs	from	an	extreme	trial	sample	from	the	simulations	in	the	second	row	with	100	observations	in	total;	the	histogram	shows	the	1,000	estimates	of	the	ATE	for	that	trial	sample.	This	trial	sample	has	a	single	large	outlying	treatment	effect	of	48.3;	the	mean	(s.d.)	of	the	other	99	observations	is	–0.51	(2.1);	when	the	outlier	is	in	the	treatment	group,	we	get	the	right-hand	side	of	the	figure,	when	it	is	in	the	control	group,	we	get	the	left-hand	side.				
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